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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation provides evidence to the two contentious debate over health 
policies and laws in the US, Medicaid expansion and sex offender registration and 
notification. In Chapter 2, I explore one key determinant of Medicaid take-up, the benefit 
of access to care proxied by the Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care physician payment 
ratio. Using a unique dataset of Medicaid physician reimbursement rates and the 
American Community Survey of 2010 – 14, I find that a 10-percentage-point increase in 
the payment ratio of a 30-minute new patient office visit will increase Medicaid 
enrollment among uninsured adults in poverty by more than 150,000. In Chapter 3, we 
re-examine the impact of Medicaid on birth outcomes. To mitigate the crowd-out from 
private insurance to Medicaid, we focus on the population eligible for Medicaid during its 
implementation period. Using predicted individual-level Medicaid treatment intensity 
among childbearing age women and state-level variation from Medicaid roll-out, we find 
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that Medicaid provision shifted the labor delivery method from not in a hospital (with a 
midwife or a physician) to in a hospital and increased birth weight modestly. These 
impacts were driven by nonwhite mothers and mothers aged 30 – 49. Chapter 4 evaluates 
sex offenders’ crime-risk. Using the single-family residential property data of 2008 – 
2018 and sex offender data of April 2019 in Maryland, we apply the spatial difference-in-
difference method to estimate the crime risk capitalized into housing markets. The results 
suggest no negative impact on proximate home values within the 0.1-mile of sex 
offenders’ residences after their arrivals.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Health Insurance and Sex Offender Policies in the US 
The United States is experiencing one of the most significant changes in the 
health care history, the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA’s objective was to expand 
health insurance coverage to the uninsured through health insurance exchanges, Medicaid 
expansion, and the individual mandate, among others. Since its implementation, there has 
been a contentious debate over its impact on access to health care and health, especially 
over Medicaid expansion. Indeed, evaluating the impact of health insurance coverage on 
health is complicated. Health is determined by many factors (e.g., income), which also 
affects insurance coverage status. Even if controlling these factors, the effect of insurance 
on health may not be evident within a short period. To evaluate the effectiveness of the 
public health insurance, the first question to ask is whether or not Medicaid reaches the 
target population, or what proportion of the target population takes-up the insurance.  
Chapter 2 aims to evaluate one key determinant of Medicaid take-up, the benefit 
of access to care. Although Medicaid provides healthcare services almost free of charge 
to many disadvantaged individuals, take-up rates have long been below 100 percent. This 
chapter seeks to examine a potential determinant of Medicaid take-up: the reimbursement 
rate to primary care providers. Traditionally, the Medicaid reimbursement rate for 
primary care was lower than that of Medicare or private insurance plans. The Affordable 
Care Act raised the primary care reimbursement rate of Medicaid to match that of 
Medicare during 2013–14. This chapter evaluates the impact of Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement rate on Medicaid coverage among low-income non-elderly adults. The 
analysis is conducted using a generalized difference-indifferences method and a novel 
dataset of Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care reimbursement ratios combined with the 
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American Community Survey of 2010–14. The results show that a 10-percentage-point 
increase in the reimbursement ratio of the 30-minute new patient office visit is associated 
with a 0.40-percentage-point increase in Medicaid coverage rate among adults whose 
family income is below 250% of the federal poverty line. This association is most 
significant among the near-elderly (aged 50–64), non-parents, African-Americans, and 
those living in urban areas. The reimbursement ratio is also negatively associated with the 
uninsured rate, but not with the privately insured rate. Overall, these findings suggest that 
Medicaid physician payment policies are effective in promoting public insurance take-up 
among potential beneficiaries.  
Once Medicaid reaches the target population, the next question to ask is if 
Medicaid improves access to care and health outcomes among them. Chapter 3 addresses 
the question based on the population eligible for Medicaid during its initial provision 
period. Previous literature found mixed results on the impact of Medicaid on birth 
outcomes. Most studies focused on the Medicaid expansion period, suffering from 
crowd-out of private insurance into Medicaid. In this chapter, we reevaluate the impact of 
Medicaid on prenatal care utilization and birth outcomes. To minimize the concern of 
crowd-out, we focus on the population during the initial Medicaid rollout period, when 
individuals eligible for Medicaid were unlikely to be covered by private insurance. Also, 
we exploit individual-level variation by simulating Medicaid treatment intensity in 
addition to state-by-year variation during Medicaid rollout. Specifically, we predict 
women’s probabilities of being treated by Medicaid using 1963 National Health 
Interview Survey data and match them to babies in Vital Statistics Natality birth data of 
1968 – 1973 based on their mothers’ socioeconomic characteristics. We find that 
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Medicaid provision improved access to care by shifting labor delivery from not in a 
hospital (with a physician or a midwife) to in a hospital. Further, we find that Medicaid 
increased the birth weight by 0.7%. Our results suggest that Medicaid provision improved 
health care utilization among pregnant women and their birth outcomes.  
In addition to the debate over health insurance policies and laws, the debate over 
the sex offender policies and laws continued in the US during the past two decades. In 
response to several horrific crimes conducted by sex offenders towards children, the US 
implemented a series of laws targeting sex offenders, including registration, community 
notification, and residency restriction laws, among others. These laws are based on the 
following three main premises. First, sex offenders are more likely to re-commit crimes 
in areas where they live compared to other criminals. Second, sex crimes are committed 
by strangers who newly moved into neighborhoods rather than someone familiar with. 
Third, through empowering the public with the knowledge of sex offenders living in the 
same communities and increasing the penalty of sex offenses, these registration and 
notification laws will reduce the recidivism rate among sex offenders. In the past two 
decades, however, scholars struggled to find evidence supporting these premises and 
found these laws might increase the rate of recidivism (Schram and Milloy 1995, Adkins 
et al. 2000, Vásquez, Maddan, and Walker 2008, Agan 2011, Prescott and Rockoff 2011). 
Further, these laws stigmatized sex offenders and their families, preventing them from re-
integrating into communities, finding housing, and employment opportunities (Zevitz and 
Farkas 2000, Tewksbury 2005, Levenson and Cotter 2005).  
Also, the landscape of sex offender registration and notification laws has changed 
a lot during the past two decades. With the establishment of the Protect Act in 2003 and 
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the Adam Walsh Act in 2006, the primary community notification method changed from 
proactive to a passive notification method, i.e., sex offender registry websites. Because of 
these backgrounds, it is essential to re-evaluate the crimes risk caused by sex offenders. 
One important technique to measure the crime risk due to sex offenders is to use the 
revealed preference approach to evaluate the risk capitalized into housing markets. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of crime risk from sex offenders’ arrivals, perceived 
through sex offender registry websites, on proximate property values. Using single-
family residential house dataset of 2008 – 2018 and registered sex offender dataset of 
April 2019 in four counties of Maryland, this paper shows no evidence of negative 
externality created by sex offenders’ arrivals on property values in the vicinity. This 
result contributes to the continuous debate over the sex offender registration and 
notification laws, suggesting little financial burden created by sex offenders’ arrivals on 
proximate households. 
In Chapter 5, the main conclusions the policy implications are revisited. Future 
work and extensions of this dissertation are also explored.  
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Chapter 2: Physician Payment and Demand for Health Insurance: Evidence from 
Medicaid Primary Care Payment Parity  
2.1 Introduction 
The uninsured rate is highest among non-elderly adults.1 Although the Medicaid 
expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to expand health insurance 
coverage to the uninsured population, low-income adults’ uninsured rate is still high. As 
of 2017, 25.7% adults in poverty, compared to 7.8% of children, remained uninsured 
(Berchick, Hood, and Barnett 2018). One reason for the insurance coverage gap is low 
take-up of Medicaid. During 2005–2010, the national average Medicaid take-up rate was 
estimated to be 62.6 percent among non-elderly adults and 38.3 percent among childless 
adults, who were eligible for Medicaid and not covered by private insurance (Sommers, 
Tomasi, et al. 2012). This phenomenon of incomplete take-up of Medicaid, and more 
broadly welfare programs, among potential beneficiaries, has attracted numerous 
researchers to examine take-up barriers and to develop policy tools to help mitigate the 
barriers (see (Currie 2006) for a review). The barriers include a lack of program 
knowledge, transaction costs during the enrollment process, welfare stigma, and low 
program benefits (Moffitt 1983, Kubik 1999, Currie and Grogger 2002, Aizer 2007). In 
the context of Medicaid, little research has been done to understand the barrier of low 
program benefits. 
In this paper, I explore the impact of the Medicaid benefit of access to care on 
Medicaid coverage among adults. Potential Medicaid beneficiaries face great access 
                                                          
1 This is based on the author’s calculation using the health insurance coverage reports of 2000 – 17 from the 
Census Bureau. 
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barrier to primary care. It is because primary care physicians are often reluctant to accept 
new Medicaid patients (Decker 2012, Rhodes et al. 2014) and, even for existing Medicaid 
patients, offer low-quality services (Decker 2007, 2009). According to the surveys of 
physicians, the most-stated reason for nonparticipation is the low reimbursement rate 
(Long 2013). Primary care is reimbursed at a particularly low rate among all services. In 
2012, Medicaid reimbursed 66% of Medicare rate for all services and 59% of that for 
primary care services (Zuckerman and Goin 2012).  
To increase primary care physicians’ participation and thus alleviate access 
barrier, the ACA mandated both fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement rate and managed 
care (MC) capitation rate for primary care services furnished in 2013–14 at the Medicare 
level (hereinafter referred to as the Medicaid primary care payment parity or fee bump).2 
The parity affected each state’s Medicaid primary care physician payment differently, 
depending on the state’s payment level before the mandate. On average, this parity 
increased the amount reimbursed to primary care physicians by approximately 55% from 
2012 to 2013, and by 50% from 2012 to 2014.3 Given that primary care is essential for 
preventive care and care continuity (Friedberg, Hussey, and Schneider 2010) and the high 
prevalence of chronic illnesses among potential Medicaid beneficiaries, adults eligible for 
Medicaid may increase the program take-up once access barrier is reduced. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of the Medicaid benefit of 
access to primary care, proxied by Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care reimbursement 
                                                          
2 Medicaid primary care payment parity applies to primary care services, including evaluation and 
management services and vaccine administration, furnished by physicians specialized in family medicine, 
general internal medicine, or pediatric medicine. 
3 This is based on the author’s calculation of the Medicaid reimbursement rate for 30-minute new patient 
office visit in 2012–14.  
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ratio, on Medicaid coverage among adults. To achieve this objective, I merged a novel 
dataset of state-level Medicaid-to-Medicare reimbursement ratios (hereinafter referred to 
as fee ratios) for adult patient office visits with individual-level data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS) of 2010 – 14. The sample was restricted to nonpregnant 
civilian adults aged 27–64, whose family income was below 250% of the federal poverty 
line (FPL). To utilize the state-by-year variations in the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios, 
this study used a generalized difference-in-differences (DD) method. The analysis 
controlled both individual- and state-level characteristics, such as demographics, state 
financial health status, primary care physician supply, and Medicaid income eligibility 
thresholds, that could be correlated with the fee ratios and have independent effects on 
Medicaid coverage. The state-specific linear trends were included to purge further 
omitted variable bias. State and year fixed effects were used. 
This study finds that the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits 
are positively associated with Medicaid coverage among low-income non-elderly adults. 
For instance, a 10-percentage-point increase in the fee ratio of a 30 (45)-minute new 
patient office visit is associated with a 0.40 (0.36)-percentage-point increase in adult 
Medicaid coverage rate. Also, the same increase in the fee ratio is associated with a 0.40 
(0.39) percentage-point decrease in the uninsured rate, while not being associated with a 
change in the privately insured rate. To compare the estimate of adults with that of 
children (Hahn 2013), I restricted the sample to be adults in poverty. I find that a 10-
percentage point increase in the fee ratio of a 30-minute new patient office visit will 
increase Medicaid enrollment status by 0.9-percentage-point and reduce uninsured status 
by 0.7-percentage point among adults in poverty. These estimates are consistent with the 
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previous study. Because more than 22 million adults were in poverty, and 26% of them 
were uninsured as of 2017, the estimates suggest that more than 150,000 uninsured adults 
would enroll in Medicaid. Further, stratified analyses find that the positive association 
between the fee ratios and Medicaid coverage rate is most significant among the near-
elderly, non-parents, African-Americans, as well as those living inside central cities of 
metropolitan areas. 
Numerous robustness checks were implemented. First, I added additional state-
level controls, including MC penetration rate, welfare caseload, and the federal medical 
assistance percentage (FMAP). Second, alternative criteria were used to determine 
potential Medicaid beneficiaries, such as educational attainment less than a high school 
diploma. Third, the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios under both FFS and MC were used 
to measure the Medicaid physician payment level relative to Medicare. Fourth, the year 
2014 was excluded from the sample, mitigating potential bias from the Medicaid demand 
increase due to eligibility expansions. Fifth, the logistic model was used. The baseline 
results were robust to all these checks. Finally, the results passed a falsification test using 
the sample of adults whose family income was above 400% of the FPL. 
The contribution of this study is three-fold. Departing from a previous study on 
children (Hahn 2013), this study, to my knowledge, is the first to examine the effect of 
Medicaid primary care reimbursement rate on Medicaid coverage among adults.4 
Compared to children, Medicaid participation rate among adults is substantially lower 
(Sommers and Epstein 2010, Kenney, Lynch, et al. 2012). Once enrolled in Medicaid, 
                                                          
4 One working paper examined the relationship between the Medicaid reimbursement rate for all specialty 
services and the Medicaid coverage among the non-elderly using state-level data (Chen, 2014). 
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adults face a more severe barrier of access to care than children (Bodenheimer and Pham 
2010, Rosenbaum 2014). Thus, it is critical to examine the access barrier and Medicaid 
take-up among adults. Second, the findings suggest that a higher Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement rate will increase Medicaid participation among uninsured adults eligible 
for Medicaid. Third, this implication highlights the critical role of the higher 
reimbursement rate in the context of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. With the increased 
competition for physicians among newly enrolled and existing Medicaid patients, 
terminating the payment parity might substantially increase patients’ barrier of access to 
care and thus uninsured rate. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of 
Medicaid physician payment rates and the Medicaid primary care payment parity. Section 
3 provides a literature review to explain why the relationship between Medicaid primary 
care reimbursement rates and Medicaid coverage may exist. Section 4 presents the data 
sources for this study. Section 5 specifies the generalized DD method. Section 6 
illustrates the method graphically and reports the baseline results. Section 7 reports the 
results of robustness checks and placebo tests. Section 8 extends the analyses using 
subsamples and other insurance coverage rates. Finally, section 9 concludes by 
summarizing the study’s findings and discussing limitations as well as policy 
implications. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Medicaid Physician Payment 
Medicaid delivers physicians’ services through two systems: FFS and MC. Under 
FFS, state Medicaid programs pay physicians reimbursement rates (or fee) on a per-claim 
10 
 
basis and often adjust the reimbursement rates for the site of service and patients’ age 
(children versus adults). More specifically, the payment rates are determined using the 
following three methods. As of October 2013, 22 states paid physicians using the 
resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS), which is based on the relative value of 
each physician procedure and is used for Medicare rate development; 17 states paid a 
fixed percentage of the Medicare rate; and ten states developed a state-specific rate 
schedule developed from market value or via an internal process (Medicaid, Chip 
Payment, and Access Commission 2017). Under MC, states pay Medicaid managed care 
organizations a capitation payment per member per month for each person enrolled in the 
organizations’ plans. The plans often negotiate with providers to provide services for 
their enrollees on an FFS basis, either through traditional FFS or through a primary care 
case management (PCCM) arrangement (Medicaid, Chip Payment, and Access 
Commission 2011).5 
The disparity in physician payment between Medicaid and other payers is 
increasing over time. Despite the general principle that the rate is sufficient to ensure 
access to care or cover all reasonable and appropriate service costs (Social Security Act 
1902(a)(30)(A), Title 42 CFR 438.4), there is very little guidance on physician payment 
under either FFS or MC. Also, states are not required to monitor the quality of care 
received by Medicaid patients. Without close oversight at the federal level, states have 
considerable discretion when it comes to Medicaid reimbursement policy and have 
historically paid a considerably lower reimbursement rate to Medicaid providers 
                                                          
5 Under PCCM, primary care providers are paid a monthly fee to coordinate enrollees’ care and assure their 
access. 
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compared to other payers (e.g., Medicare). Further, states often cut Medicaid 
reimbursement rates, especially during economic downturns, to balance the budget. 
The Medicaid physician payment used in the main analysis of this paper is based 
on FFS. Despite states’ transitions from FFS toward MC, Medicaid FFS reimbursement 
rate remains a good proxy for Medicaid physician payment for the following reasons. As 
of July 2014, over 40% of approximately 71 million Medicaid beneficiaries were covered 
by programs based on the FFS payment method (Government Accountability Office 
2016). In the fiscal year 2015, the majority (54%) of national Medicaid spending was for 
services delivered under FFS (Medicaid, Chip Payment, and Access Commission 2016). 
Also, the change in FFS payment affects that under MC, because capitation rate often 
benchmarks Medicaid reimbursement rate (Howell, Palmer, and Adams 2012, 
Zuckerman and Goin 2012, Medicaid, Chip Payment, and Access Commission 2017). 
2.2.2 Medicaid Primary Care Payment Parity 
The Medicaid primary care payment parity under the ACA mandated a two-year 
increase of Medicaid physician payment for primary care services, under both FFS and 
MC, to Medicare Part B levels in 2013 and 2014 (Public Law 111-152). The parity 
required the federal government to fully fund the gap in the payment between the state 
plan level as of July 1, 2009, and the level required in 2013–14.6 The states that reduced 
the primary care physician reimbursement rate after July 1, 2009, were required to make 
up the reduced portion using state funding (Federal Register Vol.77 No. 215). Potentially 
due to the late publication of Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) final 
                                                          
6 The required rate was the higher of the effective Medicare rate in 2013-14, or the applicable rate using 
2009 conversion factor. 
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rule on implementing the parity and operational difficulties in establishing the parity, 
especially under MC, most states reported making the first enhanced payment in May 
2013 or later (Medicaid, Chip Payment, and Access Commission 2015). In these cases, 
states were required to make supplemental payments to make up the difference between 
the amount paid and the required rates retroactively (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services 2012). While the federal government no longer funded the parity beyond 2014, 
eighteen states continued the fee bump at least partially in 2015 (Wilk, Evans, and Jones 
2018). 
Primary care services furnished from Jan 1, 2013, to Dec 31, 2014, including 
evaluation and management services of the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 
99201-99499 and vaccine administration services for children of the CPT code 90460-
90461 or 90471-90474, were eligible for the fee bump (Tollen 2015). The eligible 
evaluation and management services included both new and established patient office 
visits. New patient office visits usually lasted 30 minutes (CPT code 99203) or 45 
minutes (CPT code: 99204), and because they often involved evaluations of undiagnosed 
signs, symptoms, or health concerns, they typically lasted longer than later office visits. 
Established patient office visits usually lasted 15 minutes (CPT code 99213) or 25 
minutes (CPT code 99214). Also, both physicians and non-physician practitioners with a 
primary designation of family medicine, general internal medicine, or pediatric medicine 
were eligible for the fee bump. 
2.3 Literature Review 
This study builds upon three strands of literature. The first is related to studies on 
the relationship between Medicaid primary care reimbursement rate and the behavior of 
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healthcare providers. Theoretically, Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) proposed a 
model of physician behavior in a multi-payer market, which predicts that physicians, who 
accept both private and Medicaid patients, will provide more service to Medicaid patients 
and less service to private patients following a reimbursement rate increase; however, 
physicians, who accept private patients only, may not start accepting Medicaid patients 
after the rate increase. Later, the model of physician behavior with demand inducement 
concludes that an increase in Medicaid payment would induce higher demand among 
Medicaid patients, assuming the substitution effect dominates the income effect from the 
rate increase (McGuire and Pauly 1991, Gruber and Owings 1996). 
Empirically, some literature has found that the rate increase is associated with 
more private providers accepting (new) Medicaid-covered patients (Decker 2007, 2012, 
Alexander and Schnell 2018). However, other literature has found that the rate increase 
was not associated with a higher Medicaid participation rate or Medicaid service volume 
among primary care physicians (Decker 2018, Mulcahy, Gracner, and Finegold 2018). 
Overall, the current literature has found a non-negative effect of Medicaid reimbursement 
rate on physicians’ labor supply to Medicaid patients. Extending from the direct supply-
side effect from the provider payment incentive, this study focuses on the demand-side 
effect among potential Medicaid beneficiaries who were the ultimate target of the 
Medicaid primary care payment parity. 
The second area of literature upon which this study builds is related to studies on 
the relationship between Medicaid primary care reimbursement rate and access to care. 
The current literature has found that an increase in the reimbursement rate is associated 
with a higher likelihood of having a usual source of care, and an increased volume of 
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office (outpatient, emergency department) visits and prescription filling among Medicaid 
beneficiaries (Callison and Nguyen 2018, Alexander and Schnell 2018). It was also 
associated with higher appointment availability, shorter wait-to-appointment (in days), 
and longer visit durations among Medicaid patients (Decker 2007, Polsky et al. 2015, 
Sharma et al. 2018). On the other hand, a reimbursement rate cut was found to reduce 
Medicaid beneficiaries’ visit volume and shifted their site of care from physician offices 
to hospital emergency and outpatient departments (Decker 2009). Given the better access 
to care following the reimbursement rate increase, this study proposes a hypothesis that 
the increase in the reimbursement rate is likely to increase the Medicaid take-up among 
potential beneficiaries, who perceive the quality enhancement of Medicaid relative to 
other insurances. 
Third, this study relates to a line of literature on the relationship between 
Medicaid reimbursement rate and patient outcomes. An increase in Medicaid primary 
care reimbursement rate increase was associated with improved self-reported general 
health among all beneficiaries and with school attendance among children beneficiaries 
(Alexander and Schnell 2018). It was also correlated with less substance use disorders 
treatment or tobacco product use and better mental health among beneficiaries (Maclean 
et al. 2018). A Medicaid reimbursement rate increase for other services also improved 
beneficiaries’ health outcomes. An increase in the Medicaid payment to obstetrical 
services was associated with higher birth weight (Sonchak 2015), lower risk of low and 
very low birth weight (Gray 2001), and lower infant mortality (Currie, Gruber, and 
Fischer 1995). Higher Medicaid payments for dental services was correlated with more 
frequent dental visits (Buchmueller, Orzol, and Shore-Sheppard 2015, Decker and Lipton 
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2015), which may improve dental health. The reasons for the improvement in patient 
outcomes could be that higher reimbursement rate incentivizes physicians to see patients 
more often. Additionally, this study proposes another possible channel for this 
improvement to the extent that the reimbursement rate increase might encourage 
Medicaid take-up among potential beneficiaries, leading to more widespread, regular 
health care utilization and consequently better health outcomes. On the other hand, the 
improvement in patient outcomes could further enhance the quality of Medicaid, 
promoting more participation in Medicaid. 
Although the literature has found various benefits of the reimbursement rate 
increase on both supply and demand sides, there are three impediments, however, to 
increasing Medicaid take-up through the provider payment incentive. First, other reasons 
besides reimbursement rate (e.g., the transaction cost of receiving reimbursement rates) 
may reduce primary care physicians’ willingness to accept new Medicaid patients. 
Second, physicians’ willingness to accept new Medicaid patients may be hindered by 
residential segregation. Office-based primary care physicians take the majority of their 
patients from areas immediately surrounding their practice locations, whereas the 
Medicaid population is concentrated in depressed inner-city areas underserved by the 
physicians (Fossett et al. 1992, Rosenbaum 2014). Third, potential beneficiaries may not 
seek primary care if they have been receiving charity care in federally qualified health 
centers or hospitals. Therefore, the relationship between Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement rate and Medicaid coverage remains uncertain. 
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2.4 Data and Sample 
2.4.1 Medicaid-to-Medicare Reimbursement Ratio 
For this analysis, I assembled a state-level dataset of the non-facility Medicaid-to-
Medicare reimbursement ratios (or fee ratios) of adult patient office visits during 2010–
14. The non-facility fee ratios reflect the relative Medicaid reimbursement rate level 
among office-based physicians. I focused on office-based physicians for two reasons. 
First, Medicaid patients are less likely to be seen in physician offices than in hospital 
outpatient or emergency departments (Baker and Royalty 2000, Decker 2009). Second, 
physicians practicing in office settings have more discretion over participating in 
Medicaid (Perloff, Kletke, and Fossett 1995). 
To construct the fee ratios, first, I collected the Medicaid reimbursement rates as 
of July 1st from the websites of states’ Medicaid agencies.7 In cases where historical fee 
schedules were not available, I contacted Medicaid agencies directly via email or phone, 
or through submitting public record requests. After collection, 40 (78%) states have 
complete data of Medicaid reimbursement rates for the full sample period 2010–14, 48 
(94%) states have complete data in the pre-parity period 2010–2012, four states have four 
years’ data8, and four other states have three years’ data9. I excluded Tennessee since it 
does not use Medicaid FFS payment method. I also excluded Hawaii and South Dakota 
due to the inability to obtain data. 
                                                          
7 Since states were required to make retroactive payments for the difference between the amount paid and 
the required rates in 2013–14, the required rates were used in these two years. 
8 The Medicaid physician reimbursement rate is missing in Delaware and Minnesota of 2013, and in Alaska 
and Indiana of 2014. 
9 The Medicaid physician reimbursement rate is missing in New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah, and West 
Virginia of 2013–14. 
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I used the Medicaid reimbursement rates for the following adult patient office 
visits, 30- and 45-minute new patient office visits as well as 15- and 25-minute 
established patient office visits. Alexander and Schnell (2018) used the reimbursement 
rate of 30-minute new patient office visits only, missing a critical component of access to 
care among potential Medicaid beneficiaries—care continuity. The services of 30- and 
45-minute new patient office visits each accounted for 41% and 33% of the total 
Medicaid FFS spending on new patient office visits in 2009. The services of 15- and 25-
minute established patient office visits each accounted for 56% and 30% of the total 
Medicaid FFS spending on established patient office visits in 2009.10 
Second, I collected the Medicare reimbursement rates of July for the same 
services from the national physician fee schedule relative value files.11 These files contain 
the measures of procedure complexity, such as relative value units, practice expense, and 
malpractice expense, as well as geographic practice cost indexes and conversion factors. I 
applied the formula of Medicare physician reimbursement rates and calculated the 
reimbursement rates per state and year. For states within which geographic practice cost 
indexes vary, I estimated population-weighted average reimbursement rates.12 Third, the 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio was calculated for each service. The fee ratio of 
Delaware was coded as one in 2013, based on the communication with the state Medicaid 
                                                          
10 The calculation was ignored the service of 99201, which was not used in (Government Accountability 
Office, 2014). 
11 CMS releases and revises the files in January, April, July, and October each year. The results are not 
sensitive to using files released in other months. 
12 The average population of each region during 2010–2016 was used for the calculation. The data of total 
cities and towns came from U.S. Census Bureau. 
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agency. In the final dataset of Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios, forty-one (80%) states 
have complete data of the whole sample period. 
Figure 2.1 plots the change of Medicaid-to-Medicare reimbursement rate ratios 
for 30minute new patient office visit across states from 2010 to 2014.13  Twenty-nine 
states did not change their Medicaid reimbursement rate between 2010 and 2012, and the 
rest states changed their rate by less than 10% in the absolute term during this period 
except Connecticut and Minnesota.14 Similarly, all states (except Maryland, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming) changed their Medicare reimbursement rate by less than 5% in 
the absolute term in these three years.15 The reimbursement rate ratio ranged from 0.21 to 
1.39, and its median value stayed at 0.7 throughout the three years. While the median 
Medicare reimbursement rate for 30-minute new patient office visit increased by 1.5% 
only from $104.47 in 2012 to $106.06 in 2014, the median Medicaid reimbursement rate 
for the same service increased by 45% from $74.38 in 2012 to $107.77 in 2014, moving 
the reimbursement rate ratio into the top quintile across all states in 2014.16 
2.4.2 American Community Survey 
The primary dataset used for the analysis came from the American Community 
Survey (ACS), an annual national mandatory survey with over 3.5 million households 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios were 
                                                          
13 The variations of the rates for other services are similar during this period. 
14 Connecticut had a 14.5% fee bump from 2011 to 2012 and Minnesota had 124% rate increase from 2010 
to 2011. 
15 The Medicare reimbursement rate for 30-minute new patient office visit increased by 5.69% in Maryland, 
by 5.3% in South Dakota, and by 7.85% in Wyoming. 
16 Although Alaska and North Dakota Medicaid programs reimbursed physicians above the level of Medicare 
before the parity, their reimbursement rates increased from 2012 to 2014. For instance, the Medicaid rate in 
North Dakota increased from $140.07 (compared to the Medicare rate of $104.58) in 2012 to $152.62 
(compared to the Medicare rate of $106.02) in 2014. 
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matched to the individuals in the ACS data based on state identifiers. Since the fee ratios 
are not available in Hawaii, South Dakota, and Tennessee, I excluded these states from 
ACS data. 
I restricted the sample to civilian adults aged 27 to 64, whose family income is 
below 250% of the FPL, and who did not give birth to a child within one year before the 
survey. With these sample restrictions, the sample contains 2,169,335 non-elderly non-
pregnant civilian adults, 26% of whom were covered by Medicaid (Table 2.1). The 
average age of the adults was 46, 54% of them were female, and 43% were married. 
Regards to racial distribution, 74% were white, 17% were black, 3% each were Hispanic 
and Asian. Less than half (47%) of them had a high school or equivalent degrees, a 
quarter had some college education, and 14% had college degrees. On average, their 
family income was at 135% of the FPL. 
2.5 Empirical Approach 
I used a generalized difference-in-differences (DD) method to examine the impact 
of Medicaid benefit of access to care, proxied by Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care fee 
ratios, on Medicaid coverage among non-elderly adults. The generalized DD method uses 
a continuous variable to proxy for the treatment intensities of multiple groups (e.g., 
states) in numerous periods (e.g., years). Formally, I estimated the following linear 
probability model (LPM). 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡  
(1) 
In this equation, Medicaid is an indicator of being covered by Medicaid; 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 stands 
for Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care fee ratios; X is a vector of individual-level 
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characteristics including age, gender, marriage status, race, income and levels of 
education attainment, such as having a high school degree (or other equivalent ones), 
some college education, and a college degree. The average treatment effect of the 
Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care fee ratios on adults’ Medicaid coverage is captured 
by 𝛽1. Its validity relies on the assumption that the fee ratio is exogenous to the system of 
demand for Medicaid. This assumption would fail if the change in fee ratio was a tool to 
increase physician participation, thus Medicaid take-up, or was correlated with state 
policies and conditions affecting the demand for Medicaid. To address this concern of 
endogeneity, I included a vector Z containing the following state-level covariates in the 
baseline specification. I also tested baseline results’ sensitivity to the endogeneity of the 
fee ratio by restricting the sample period to 2012–14 in robustness checks (see Section 7: 
Robustness Checks and Placebo Test).   
First, I included two measures of macroeconomic condition and state financial 
health status. During economic downturns, states may reduce Medicaid physician 
reimbursement rate to balance budget. In the meantime, more individuals may become 
impoverished and qualified for Medicaid. Failing to control these would lead to a 
spurious relationship between Medicaid physician payment and Medicaid coverage. So, I 
included tax revenue per capita17 and the unemployment rate18. 
Second, I included a measure of primary care physician supply. States may 
increase primary care reimbursement rate to encourage primary care physicians’ 
                                                          
17 The total tax revenue data comes from the Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Since the survey does not contain the tax revenue data of District 
of Columbia in 2010-2012, I supplemented the data using the DC Tax Facts. The state population data is 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
18 The unemployment data is from the Bureau of labor statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 
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participation in Medicaid when there is a shortage of primary care physicians. An 
increase in the number of primary care physicians may increase the overall acceptance of 
Medicaid patients, improving their access to care, thus increasing the Medicaid take-up 
among potential beneficiaries. The omission of primary care physician supply would 
result in underestimation of β1. Thus, I included an active primary care physician to 
population ratio per state and year.19 
Third, I included Medicaid income eligibility thresholds. Medicaid income 
eligibility expansion increases the demand for Medicaid and thus increases the total 
number of enrollees. In the meantime, the Medicaid income eligibility thresholds were 
negatively associated with the reimbursement rates over the sample period; more liberal 
states had higher income eligibility limits but lower reimbursement rates.20 Without the 
inclusion of the Medicaid income eligibility limits would lead to an underestimation. To 
avoid this bias, I included Medicaid income eligibility thresholds of both parents and 
childless adults.21 
In addition to the state-level controls, Trend is a vector of the state-specific linear 
trend to control for any other confounding time-varying factors unique to each state. 
                                                          
19 The active primary care physician to population ratio is from bi-annual State Physician Workforce Data 
Reports, produced by the Association of American Medical Colleges. The report is available in the years 
2009, 2011, 2013, 2015. I interpolated the ratio of other years using the active primary care physician 
and population in the closest years. 
20 The data is available upon request. 
21 Both eligibility thresholds were from the Kaiser Family Foundation, taking into account earning 
disregards and the Medicaid expansion status in 2014. The parents’ income eligibility thresholds were 
based on a family of three. The childless adults’ income eligibility thresholds were based on the 
coverages providing full Medicaid benefits. The childless adults’ income eligibility thresholds for waiver 
programs providing more limited benefits or for fully state-funded programs were not included. Since 
the survey does not cover the childless adults’ threshold of 2010, I collected them from state websites. 
Only Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, New York, Vermont provided full 
Medicaid benefits for childless adults in 2011. I interpolated the benefits threshold of 2010 based on the 
states’ websites. 
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These factors could include the hassle of Medicaid enrollment process (e.g., Face-to-face 
interview requirement when applying), other benefits and costs of Medicaid (e.g., annual 
cost sharing), and state contextual factors (e.g., presumptive eligibility, asset test for 
eligibility determination, asset limit, et al.) (Sommers, Buchmueller, et al. 2012, Hahn 
2013). Finally, State is a vector of state fixed effects, Year is a vector of year fixed 
effects, and ε is a random error. The variation for identification comes from the change of 
the primary care fee ratio within states over the years. Robust standard errors were 
clustered at the state-level to allow for any within-state serial correlation. All estimates 
used ACS sampling weights. 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Graphical Evidence 
Figure 2.2 plots the national average Medicaid coverage rate among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27–64, whose income was below 250% of the FPL. It shows that the 
average Medicaid coverage rate increased from 2010 to 2012, before decreasing 
somewhat from 2012 to 2013, and increased substantially from 2013 to 2014. Part of the 
reason for the substantial increase was the Medicaid expansion started in 2014, targeting 
adults with income less than 138% of the FPL. 
The DD method requires a treatment and control group to follow the same pre-
trend. As an internal validity check of the DD method, I separated the states into two 
groups according to the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios in 2012. Specifically, the states 
with the fee ratios below the national median in 2012 had a more substantial fee ratio 
increase from 2012 to 2013, thus were treated as a treatment group (dashed line). The 
other states had a smaller fee ratio increase during the period and were treated as a 
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control group (solid line). A similar trend of the average Medicaid coverage rate among 
the treatment and control groups before 2013 would enhance the internal validity of the 
DD method. Figure 2.3 presents that the treatment and control group follow the same 
trend of adult Medicaid coverage rate through 2012. 
The DD method compares the pre-post difference in the average Medicaid 
coverage rate of the treatment group with that of the control group. The result of the 
comparison is the DD estimator, β1, reflecting the average effect of the reimbursement 
rate on adult Medicaid coverage rate. Figure 2.3 shows that the Medicaid coverage rate of 
the control group dropped by approximately 0.5-percentage-point, while that of treatment 
group stayed almost the same when the primary care payment parity started in 2013. The 
Medicaid coverage rates of both groups followed a very similar trend from 2013 to 2014, 
when the fee ratios stayed almost unchanged. This graph shows that the parity was 
associated with an approximately 0.5-percentage-point increase in the Medicaid coverage 
rate among adults. 
2.6.2 Medicaid Coverage Rate 
Table 2.2 presents the baseline regression results of the DD method. Since all the 
fee ratios are in decimal points, their coefficients multiplied by ten are interpreted as the 
effect of a 10percentage-point increase in the fee ratios. Results show that the increases in 
the fee ratios for patient office visits are associated with higher Medicaid coverage 
probability among adults. Column 1 & 2 show that a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 of 30- (45) minute new patient office visit is associated with a 0.40 (0.36)-
percentage-point increase in adult Medicaid coverage probability (reflecting 1.5 (1.4) 
percent increase relative to the mean). This Medicaid coverage increase could happen 
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through two channels. A higher payment to a new patient office visit incentivizes 
physicians to accept new Medicaid patients, who would otherwise not have access to 
primary care or specialty care assuming no charity care. Further, physicians may directly 
enroll uninsured new patients into Medicaid.22 Potential Medicaid beneficiaries may 
increase Medicaid take-up, perceiving the benefit of receiving healthcare under Medicaid. 
Column 3 & 4 show that the reimbursement rate increases of established patient 
office visits have a smaller and insignificant positive effect on adult Medicaid coverage. 
Specifically, a 10-percentage-point increase of the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 of 15- (25-) minute 
established patient office visit is associated with a 0.18 (0.15)-percentage-point increase 
in adult Medicaid coverage probability (reflecting 0.7 (0.6) percent increase relative to 
the mean). A higher payment to an established patient office visit encourages physicians 
to see established Medicaid patients more often, who would otherwise wait long before 
their next appointments. Potential beneficiaries may perceive the benefit of better care 
continuity under Medicaid and increase their participation rate. The difference between 
the estimates of new and the established patient office visit is likely due to the difference 
in perception of access to care. Previous literature found that self-rated access to care is 
mainly determined by having health insurance, rather than having continuity of care 
(Stewart et al. 1997), suggesting that the perception of access to care enhancement from 
shorter wait-to-appointment in days is likely to be less salient, compared to that from the 
change from not being accepted to being accepted by physicians. 
                                                          
22 Considering Medicaid allows benefits to be covered retroactively for up to 3 months before the month of 
application, physicians could accept new uninsured patients and enroll them into Medicaid during or 
after the new patient visit. 
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Regarding the individual- and state-level controls, their coefficients have expected 
signs and very similar magnitudes and significance across all columns. Specifically, 
being female or unmarried was more likely to be covered by Medicaid. Being African-
Americans was positively correlated with Medicaid coverage while being White or Asian 
has inverse correlations. Medicaid coverage probability decreased at an increasing rate as 
educational attainment increased. The primary care physician supply was strongly 
negatively associated with Medicaid coverage. Additionally, both types of Medicaid 
income eligibility limits were positively associated with Medicaid coverage, and the 
association was more extensive and more significant with childless adults’ limit. 
2.7 Robustness Checks and Placebo Test 
2.7.1 Additional State-level Controls 
To begin with, I included three other state-level controls to the baseline model. 
First, the diffusion of Medicaid MC delivery system across states may affect the 
physician reimbursement rate and Medicaid coverage simultaneously. The failure to 
exclude the partial effect of MC diffusion on Medicaid coverage might lead to biased 
estimates of 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. I added the MC penetration rate (column 2 of Table 2.3).23 
Second, states with higher lift in reimbursement rates may also become more generous in 
other welfare or assistance programs. These programs may raise the familiarity of 
Medicaid among their recipients and raise Medicaid take-up probability. I included the 
monthly average number of welfare recipients (column 3 of Table 2.3).24 Third, poorer 
                                                          
23 The managed care penetration rate was obtained from the annual Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment 
Reports, produced by the CMS. 
24 The data came from the Office of Family Assistance, Administration of Children & Families, Department 
of Health & Human Services. 
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states have higher Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP) and more residents 
eligible for Medicaid. Their reimbursement rate may be higher due to the higher federal 
matching rate. I included FMAP (column 4 of Table 2.3).25 The column 5 included all 
three additional controls. The results show very similar estimates and its significance of 
the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 across specifications. 
2.7.2 Various Income Cutoffs and Placebo Test 
Next, I used various low-income cutoffs to select potential Medicaid beneficiaries 
and run a placebo test. As a sensitivity test of the low-income threshold of the baseline 
model (below 250% of the FPL), I varied the threshold from below 100% of the FPL 
(column 2) to 200% of the FPL (column 4) at a step of 50% of the FPL in Table 2.4. The 
estimates are highly significant across all patient office visit services and the largest using 
the lowest income threshold. The magnitudes of the estimates decrease as the income 
threshold increases and stabilize as it reaches 250% of the FPL. For instance, a 10-
percentage point increase of the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 of 30- (45-) minute new patients’ office visit 
and 15- (25-) minute established patient office visit are associated with an additional 0.87 
(0.80) and 0.70 (0.61)-percentage-point of Medicaid coverage probability among those 
with family income below 100% of the FPL. Also, I did a placebo test using the high-
income cutoff of above 400% of the FPL. It is expected that these individuals will not 
increase their Medicaid coverage since they’re too rich to qualify for it (column 5). The 
placebo results show a miniature and negative association, if any, between the Medicaid 
primary care physician payment and their Medicaid coverage. 
                                                          
25 FMAP was collected from Federal Register. 
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2.7.3 Low Educational Attainment 
The third robustness check used low-educational attainment instead of low-
income to select individuals eligible for Medicaid, since they may reduce labor supply 
and income to qualify for Medicaid. To avoid potential selection bias, I used a sample of 
adults without a high school degree (column 1 of Table 2.5).26 The status of not having a 
high school degree is highly correlated with that of income being less than 250% of the 
FPL, with a correlation coefficient of 0.34. Also, both criteria are highly correlated with 
Medicaid coverage probability, with correlation coefficients being 0.22 (low-income) and 
0.23 (low education) respectively. The results show larger estimates of the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
across all services than the baseline results. For instance, a 10-percentage-point increase 
in the rate of 30 minutes’ new patient office visit is correlated with a 0.49-percentage-
point higher Medicaid coverage probability (reflecting a 1.5 percent increase relative to 
the mean 0.32). 
2.7.4 Expected Reimbursement Ratio Under FFS & MC 
The validity of the baseline results relies on the assumption that Medicaid 
reimbursement rate under FFS is still a good proxy for Medicaid physician payment. To 
verify this assumption, I reran the baseline model using the fee ratio under FFS & MC. If 
there is no substantial difference across the payment variation under the two methods, the 
estimates on the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 won’t change much. But, considering the impact of MC 
payment on the access to care among adults is limited,27 I expect the estimate under both 
payment methods to be smaller and less significant. 
                                                          
26 I also tried using the adults without any college education, which, however, is not highly correlated with 
either low-income or Medicaid coverage status. 
27 Please refer to the Section of Subsample Analyses for more explanation. 
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To construct an expected fee ratio under both FFS & MC, I first followed 
Alexander and Schnell (2018) to create an expected enrollment-weighted Medicaid fee 
across both FFS and MC for each service.28 Second, I divided this expected Medicaid fee 
by the corresponding Medicare fee to obtain an expected Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 
under both methods. The results show a consistent pattern of results with baseline results, 
though coefficients are smaller and less significant (column 2 of Table 2.5). A 10-
percentage point increase in the average fee ratio of 30- (45-) minute new patient office 
visit is associated with 0.25 (0.23)-percentage-point increase of Medicaid coverage 
probability. 
2.7.5 Post-2012 Sample 
As another robustness check, I tested the sensitivity of results using the post-2012 
sample. Fee ratio could be endogenous if it was internally determined by the system of 
demand for Medicaid. The baseline estimates could suffer from omitted variable bias if 
the fee ratio was correlated with state policies happen simultaneously. While there is no 
direct test for the randomness of fee ratio, I tested the sensitivity of baseline results using 
exogenous fee ratio. Specifically, I ran the baseline model using the sample of 2012–14, 
when the fee ratio was entirely determined by the primary care payment parity. Similar 
results from using the entire sample period (baseline results) and that using 2012–14 
would strengthen the confidence in the reliability of the baseline estimates. After the 
                                                          
28 This expected Medicaid fee is calculated as follows.  
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡̃ = (1 − 𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝐶) × 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑆 + 𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝐶 × 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑆 × (
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑀𝐶
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆
)𝑠,2010 (2) 
where 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑆 is the Medicaid fee under FFS for service 𝑖 in state s and year t, 𝑃𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝐶  is the percentage of 
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in comprehensive managed care per state and year, (
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑀𝐶
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆
)𝑠,2010 is MC to 
FFS fee ratio for office visits based on 20 states in 2009 and 2010 (mainly) from (Government Accountability 
Office 2014) (the median ratio of available states was used for missing states). 
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sample restriction, the estimates are larger and less significant, possibly due to weaker 
statistical power (column 3 of Table 2.5). However, there is no substantial difference 
from the baseline estimates. 
2.7.6 States with Reimbursement Ratio Available in All Years 
Besides, I examined the sensitivity of the baseline results to data incompleteness. 
In the final dataset of Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio, three states have four years’ data 
(missing the data of 2013 or 2014), four states have three years’ data (missing the data of 
2013–14), and three states (Tennessee, Hawaii, and South Dakota) have no data. If these 
states changed the Medicaid reimbursement rate in a way systematically different from 
the states with complete data in the data missing years, missing data could bias the 
estimate of interest. Addressing this, I reran the baseline results using the 41 states with 
complete fee ratio data. The estimates are very similar in magnitudes and significance to 
the baseline results (column 4 of Table 2.5). 
2.7.7 Logit Model 
Additionally, I used a logistic model instead of LPM to test the results’ sensitivity 
to the distribution assumption of random error. The error was assumed to follow a normal 
distribution in LPM and was assumed to follow a logistic distribution in the logistic 
model. Column 5 of Table 2.5 presents the estimates of marginal effects from the logistic 
model on the sample of non-elderly adults with family income below 250% of the FPL. 
The results show similar estimates on the 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. A 10-percentage-point increase in 
the fee ratio of 30- (45-) minute new patient office visit is associated with a 0.42 (0.39)-
percentage-point increase in the Medicaid coverage probability (reflecting 1.6 (1.5) 
percent increase relative to the mean). 
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2.8 Extension 
2.8.1 Subsample Analyses 
First, as states gradually moving lower-risk Medicaid population into risk-based 
MC, the aged, disabled and children with special health care needs are most likely to be 
served through FFS arrangements (Government Accountability Office 2016). Different 
from FFS reimbursement rate, MC capitation rate discourages physicians from increasing 
service volume (Robinson 2001) and has limited impact on access to care and health care 
utilization for adults (Shen and Zuckerman 2005). So, I expect the fee ratio to have a 
stronger effect on the high-risk population. While the estimates on young adults (aged 
below 50) are barely significant (column 1 of Table 2.6), the estimates on the near-elderly 
(aged 50–64) are highly significant and much bigger (column 2). Specifically, a 10-
percentage-point increase in the fee ratio for 30- (45-) minute new patient office visit is 
associated with a 0.52-percentage-point increase in Medicaid coverage rate among the 
near-elderly. Similarly, the same increase of 15- (25-) minute established patient office 
visit is associated with a 0.46 (0.44)-percentage-point increase in Medicaid coverage rate. 
These findings suggest that near-elderly, who are more likely to have marginal health 
status than younger adults, is also more likely to be covered by FFS arrangements. 
Second, the effect of the fee ratio on Medicaid coverage may differ across 
previously-eligible and newly-eligible adults. The Medicaid expansion under the ACA 
mostly affects the eligibility status of adults without dependent children (childless adults), 
who had categorical restrictions and did not qualify for Medicaid before the expansion 
(Kenney, Zuckerman, et al. 2012). Even though the full expansion did not start until 
2014, some states adopted the early expansion option to extend Medicaid coverage to 
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childless adults with income up to 200% of the FPL after 2010 (Sommers, Kenney, and 
Epstein 2014). To explore the heterogeneous effect across adults who are newly eligible 
for Medicaid and those who are not, I present the results using adults with dependent 
children living in the same household (column 3) and those without (column 4) in Table 
2.6. The results show a larger and more significant effect of fee ratios on coverage rate 
among childless adults. Specifically, a 10-percentage-point increase in the payment 
generosity of 30- (45-) minute new patient office visit is associated with a 0.45 (0.41)-
percentage-point increase in the Medicaid coverage rate among childless adults, while 
with a 0.34 (0.31)-percentage-point among adults living with children. The results using 
the payment to established patient office visits have a similar pattern. The results imply 
that the fee ratio impact is larger among newly-eligible adults, who are more likely to 
delay care because of the cost before becoming eligible for Medicaid. 
Third, the effect of the fee ratio on Medicaid coverage may vary across race. The 
racial disparity exists in the quality of access to care even among individuals covered by 
the same type of insurances. Compared to the counterpart mainly treating white patients, 
primary care physicians mostly treating African-American patients were less likely to be 
board certified and faced greater difficulties in obtaining high-quality subspecialists, 
diagnostic imaging, and nonemergency admission to hospitals for their patients (Bach et 
al. 2004). Because of the lower quality of access to care, African-American adults are 
more likely to respond to the improvement in access to care. Table 2.7 presents the 
results using white (column 1) and African-American adults (column 2). A 10-
percentage-point increase in the fee ratio for 30- (45-) minute new patient office visit is 
associated with an increase in Medicaid coverage rate by a 0.34 (0.32)-percentage-point 
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among white adults and by a 0.86 (0.77)-percentage-point among the African-Americans. 
The African-Americans’ larger effect is likely due to that higher payment attracted 
physicians, who used to accept white patients and offer a higher quality of care, to treat 
more African-American patients. 
Fourth, the impact of the fee ratio on Medicaid coverage may differ across urban 
and rural areas. Physicians in urban areas were less likely to accept new Medicaid 
patients compared to rural areas (Cunningham and May 2006, Decker 2012). This 
suggests that the barrier of access to care among Medicaid beneficiaries is higher in urban 
than that in rural areas. Also, the uninsured population is less likely to have a regular 
source of care in urban than in rural areas (Hartley, Quam, and Lurie 1994). Together, I 
expect the effect of fee ratio to be concentrated on adults living in urban areas. I 
separated the sample into three geographical areas: outside of metro areas (rural), in 
metro areas but outside of central cities (suburb), and in central cities (central city) (the 
right part of Table 2.7). Results show that a 10-percentage-point increase in the fee ratio 
for 30- (45-) minute new patients’ office visit is associated with an additional 0.39 (0.41)-
percentage-point of Medicaid coverage rate among adults living in rural areas and with 
an extra 0.74-percentage-point of Medicaid coverage rate among those in central cities, 
while with no significant Medicaid coverage increase among those in suburb areas. 
2.8.2 Other Insurance Coverage Rates 
The primary analyses imply a positive impact of Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement rate on Medicaid coverage among adult beneficiaries. This increase in 
Medicaid coverage could come from uninsured taking up Medicaid or from privately 
insured replacing private plans with Medicaid. To explore this, I ran the baseline model 
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with the dependent variable being uninsured and being privately insured. Table 2.8 shows 
that the fee ratio is negatively associated with being uninsured (column 1), while it is not 
associated with being privately insured (column 2). Specifically, a 10-percentage-point 
increase in the fee ratio of 30(45-) minute new patient office visit is associated with a 
0.40 and 0.39-percentage-point reduction in the probability of being uninsured (reflecting 
1.4 percent decrease relative to the mean 0.28). Also, a 10-percentage-point increase in 
the fee ratio of 15- (25-) minute established patient office visit is associated with a 0.32 
(0.31)-percentage-point reduction in the probability of being uninsured (reflecting 1.1 
percent decrease relative to the mean). In contrast, the estimates in column 2 are close to 
zero and insignificant, suggesting the rate increase is not associated with crowd-out from 
private insurance. 
2.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
Despite the insurance expansion under the ACA, the insurance coverage gap 
among low-income adults is still large. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact 
of raising program benefits on closing the coverage gap. Specifically, we study the effect 
of improving access to care, through increasing Medicaid primary care physician 
payments, on Medicaid coverage rate among adults. Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement rates have been consistently lower than that of Medicare and private 
insurance. Recent effort to increase the rates to Medicare level in 2013–14 aimed to 
address this payment gap and to improve access to care among Medicaid patients. Using 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios across states in 2010–2014, I showed that the Medicaid 
primary care payment parity substantially increased Medicaid rate from 2012 to 2013 
across all states. Combined with the ACS data, this study found that the fee ratio increase 
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of patient office visits was associated with a higher probability of Medicaid coverage and 
lower probability of being uninsured among low-income non-elderly adults. However, no 
relationship between the fee ratio increase and the propensity of being privately insured 
was found. For instance, a 10-percentage-point increase in the fee ratio of 30- (45-) 
minute new patient office visit was associated with a 0.40 (0.36)-percentage-point boost 
in their Medicaid coverage rate, and with a 0.40 (0.39)-percentage-point cut in their 
uninsured rate. These estimates among adults are almost 1-percentage-point less than that 
among children based on Hahn (2013). This smaller magnitude could be attributable to 
several factors, including higher information barrier, the higher opportunity cost of 
applying for Medicaid (e.g., the time (earning) lost for application), and higher welfare 
stigma among potential adult beneficiaries. 
Also, the effect of the fee ratio increase on Medicaid participation varies across 
subpopulations. First, it is concentrated on near-elderly adults rather than young adults. 
Since near-elderly are more likely to enroll in FFS programs, this result implies that 
physicians’ financial incentive to increase service volume is stronger with FFS than with 
MC programs. Second, the impact is greater among childless adults than adults living 
with dependent children, suggesting that the enhancement of access to care has a stronger 
effect on newly-eligible than previously-eligible adults. Third, the effect among African-
American adults is at least twice as high as that among white counterparts. This evidence 
is consistent with the fact that the quality of care received by African-American patients 
is lower than that received by white patients with the same type of insurances. Fourth, the 
impact is stronger among adults living in urban areas than those in rural areas. This is 
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consistent with the fact that Medicaid patients in urban areas face a more substantial 
barrier of access to care than those in rural areas. 
This paper has limitations. The main results of this paper are based on Medicaid 
reimbursement rate under FFS, which might not be a good proxy for the accessibility to 
care Medicaid MC enrollees. Despite that, FFS beneficiaries are more sensitive to better 
access to primary care. They have more complex conditions, requiring primary care 
physicians to provide better continuing care and to obtain their access to high-quality 
specialists. I expect the effect of fee ratio increase to be more salient among them. Also, 
according to the reasons discussed above and the results from the robustness check using 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio under both FFS and MC, Medicaid reimbursement rate 
under FFS is still a good proxy for the overall Medicaid payment. Also, the Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratio might suffer from endogeneity issues, which could bias the estimates 
of interest. I did an indirect test for endogeneity by gradually removing individual-level 
and state-level controls from the baseline specification. The resulting estimates are 
smaller but still significant. Besides, the robustness check results show little sensitivity to 
the inclusion of additional state-level controls. Despite being imperfect, these results all 
support that there is little concern of endogeneity using Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio. 
The effectiveness of Medicaid expansions depends on whether the target 
population take-up public insurance or not. Several factors might affect Medicaid 
participation, including information barrier, administrative burden, program benefits, and 
welfare stigma. This paper explores the program benefits in terms of access to care in 
determining Medicaid take-up. The results of this paper provide clear evidence that the 
increase in Medicaid physician reimbursement rate is effective in promoting the 
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Medicaid participation rate among low-income non-elderly adults. Further, this paper 
implies that raising physician payment under Medicaid, in addition to providing 
Medicaid, would reduce the barrier of access to care among potential Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Compared to traditional expansions in income eligibility thresholds, 
physician reimbursement rate increase is advantageous since it might not be associated 
with crowd-out from private insurance to Medicaid.  
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Figure 2.1: Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Ratio of 30-minute New Patient Office Visit 
 
Figure 2.2: Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Ratio of 30-minute New Patient Office Visit 
Notes: The map shows how the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios for 30-minute new 
patient office visit (CPT: 99203) changed over the years 2010, 2012, and 2014. The fee 
ratios were calculated by the author using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, 
collected from state Medicaid agencies and the CMS. Blank stands for states whose fee 
ratios are not available. The fee ratios of 2010 are not available in Hawaii, South Dakota, 
and Tennessee. The fee ratios of 2012 are not available in Hawaii, South Dakota, and 
Tennessee. The fee ratios of 2014 are not available in Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. 
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Figure 2.3: Medicaid Coverage Rate among Low-income Adults 
 
Notes: The figure shows that the Medicaid coverage rate among non-pregnant civilian 
adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL, increased from 2010 to 
2012, reduced somewhat from 2012 to 2013, and increased substantially from 2013 to 
2014. Data is from ACS 2010-2014. 
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Figure 2.4: Medicaid Coverage Rate among Low-income Adults Grouped by Fee Ratio in 
2012 
 
Notes: The figure shows that the Medicaid coverage rate among non-pregnant civilian 
adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. The Medicaid coverage rate 
in the states with below median fee ratios for 30-minute new patient office visit in 2012 
(dashed line) and the counterpart in those with above median fee ratios (solid line) had 
the same trend prior to the Medicaid primary care payment parity. The former stayed 
relatively constant from 2012 to 2013, while the latter dropped by a larger amount during 
this period. After the payment bump, both increased at the same rate from 2013 to 2014. 
Medicaid coverage data is from ACS 2010-2014. The fee ratios were calculated by the 
author using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected from state Medicaid 
agencies and the CMS. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome      
Medicaid Coverage 2169335 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Individual Level Control      
Age 2169335 45.85 10.99 27 64 
Female 2169335 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Married 2169335 0.43 0.5 0 1 
White 2169335 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Black 2169335 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Hispanic 2169335 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Asian 2169335 0.03 0.18 0 1 
High School Degree 2169335 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Some College Education 2169335 0.25 0.43 0 1 
College Degree 2169335 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Income (% of FPL) 2169335 134.81 71.89 1 250 
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of non-pregnant civilian adults aged 
27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. The data is from ACS 2010-2014. 
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Table 2.2: Medicaid Coverage Rates 
  
Office Visit of New Patient 
  
Office Visit of Established 
Patient 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 30 Mins 45 Mins  15 Mins 25 Mins 
FeeRatio 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗  0.0180 0.0153 
 (0.0145) (0.0128)  (0.0124) (0.0132) 
Age -0.000245 -0.000245  -0.000245 -0.000245 
 (0.000362) (0.000362)  (0.000363) (0.000363) 
Female 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗  0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗ 
 (0.00346) (0.00346)  (0.00346) (0.00346) 
Married -0.0367∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗  -0.0367∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ 
 (0.00425) (0.00425)  (0.00425) (0.00425) 
White -0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗  -0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ 
 (0.00935) (0.00935)  (0.00935) (0.00935) 
Black 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗  0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ 
 (0.00935) (0.00935)  (0.00936) (0.00936) 
Hispanic -0.0269 -0.0269  -0.0269 -0.0269 
 (0.0221) (0.0221)  (0.0221) (0.0221) 
Asian -0.0304∗∗ -0.0304∗∗  -0.0304∗∗ -0.0303∗∗ 
 (0.0135) (0.0135)  (0.0135) (0.0135) 
High School Degree -0.110∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗  -0.110∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ 
 (0.00560) (0.00560)  (0.00560) (0.00560) 
Some College 
Education -0.0396∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗  -0.0396∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗ 
 (0.00174) (0.00174)  (0.00174) (0.00174) 
College Degree -0.115∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗  -0.115∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ 
 (0.00694) (0.00694)  (0.00694) (0.00694) 
Income -0.00141∗∗∗ -0.00141∗∗∗  -0.00141∗∗∗ -0.00141∗∗∗ 
 (0.0000862) (0.0000862)  (0.0000862) (0.0000862) 
Unemployment Rate -0.00315 -0.00298  -0.00308 -0.00316 
 (0.00309) (0.00319)  (0.00308) (0.00303) 
Tax Per Capita 0.00200 0.000962  0.00331 0.00385 
 (0.00830) (0.00788)  (0.00807) (0.00820) 
Active PCP /100,000 -0.00753∗∗∗ -0.00738∗∗∗  -0.00678∗∗ -0.00668∗∗ 
 (0.00250) (0.00252)  (0.00258) (0.00257) 
Parents’ Income 
Limit 0.000248∗∗ 0.000247∗∗  0.000245∗∗ 0.000247∗∗ 
 (0.000113) (0.000114)  (0.000116) (0.000116) 
Childless Adults’ 
Income Limit 0.000379∗∗∗ 0.000380∗∗∗  0.000379∗∗∗ 0.000378∗∗∗ 
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Table 2.2 Cont’d: Medicaid Coverage Rates 
 
  
Office Visit of New Patient 
  
Office Visit of Established 
Patient 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Childless Adults’ 
Income Limit 0.000379∗∗∗ 0.000380∗∗∗  0.000379∗∗∗ 0.000378∗∗∗ 
 (0.0000475) (0.0000480)  (0.0000470) (0.0000467) 
N 2095408 2095408   2095408 2095408 
R-squared 0.136 0.136   0.136 0.136 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. Column 1 uses 
the fee ratio of 30 minutes’ new patient office visits, column 2 uses that of 45 minutes’ 
new patient office visits, column 3 uses that of 15 minutes’ established patient office 
visits, and column 4 uses that of 25 minutes’ established patient office visits. All 
regressions use state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear yearly trend. The 
fee ratios were calculated by the author using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement 
rates, collected from state Medicaid agencies and the CMS. Main data is from ACS 
2010-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ 
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + p<0.15. 
  
43 
 
Table 2.3: Additional State-level Controls 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Baseline MC Rate 
Welfare 
Caseloads FMAP All Included 
FeeRatio 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗ 0.0403∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗ 0.0392∗∗ 
  (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0152) 
      
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗ 
  (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0134) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0180 0.0160 0.0177 0.0180 0.0159 
  (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0136) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0153 0.0131 0.0150 0.0153 0.0130 
  (0.0132) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0146) 
N 2095408 2095408 2095408 2095408 2095408 
R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. Only the 
coefficients on the fee ratios are included. The first part uses the fee ratio of 30 
minutes’ new patient office visits; the second part uses that of 45 minutes’ new patient 
office visits; the third part uses that of 15 minutes’ established patient office visits, and 
the fourth part uses that of 25 minutes’ established patient office visits. Column 1 
repeats the baseline specification, column 2 adds Medicaid MC penetration rate, 
column 3 adds an average monthly number of welfare recipients (1,000s), column 4 
adds FMAP, and column 5 adds all three controls. All regressions use state and year 
fixed effects and state-specific linear yearly trend. The fee ratios were calculated by the 
author using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected from state 
Medicaid agencies and the CMS. Main data is from ACS 2010-2014. The MC 
penetration rate is from the annual Medicaid MC Enrollment Reports of the CMS. The 
monthly number of welfare recipients comes from the Office of Family Assistance, 
Administration of Children & Families. FMAP is from Federal Register. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + 
p<0.15. 
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Table 2.4: Various Income Cutoffs and Placebo Test 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Baseline 
≤250% FPL 
≤100% 
FPL 
≤150% 
FPL 
≤200% 
FPL 
Placebo 
≥400% FPL 
FeeRatio 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ -0.00215 
  (0.0145) (0.0238) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.00246) 
      
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0399∗∗∗ -0.00250 
  (0.0128) (0.0227) (0.0165) (0.0147) (0.00230) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0180 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0285∗ 0.0213 -0.00342 
  (0.0124) (0.0211) (0.0167) (0.0148) (0.00224) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0153 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0251 0.0176 -0.00330 
  (0.0132) (0.0222) (0.0175) (0.0157) (0.00237) 
N 2095408 706935 1142270 1608285 2983710 
R-squared 0.136 0.111 0.0969 0.116 0.0245 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27-64. Only the coefficients on the fee ratios are included. The first 
part uses the fee ratio of 30 minutes’ new patient office visits; the second part uses that 
of 45 minutes’ new patient office visits; the third part uses that of 15 minutes’ 
established patient office visits; and the fourth part uses that of 25 minutes’ established 
patient office visits. Column 1 uses the subsample of adults with income below 250% 
of the FPL, column 2 uses the subsample of adults with income below 100% of the 
FPL, column 3 uses the subsample of adults with income below 150% of the FPL, 
column 4 uses the subsample of adults with income below 200% of the FPL, and 
column 5 uses the subsample of adults with income above 400% of the FPL as a 
placebo test. All regressions use state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear 
yearly trend. The fee ratios were calculated by the author using Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursement rates, collected from state Medicaid agencies and the CMS. Main data 
is from ACS 2010-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ 
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + p<0.15. 
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Table 2.5: Further Robustness Checks 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No HighSch 
Degree 
FFS&MC 
Payment 
Post-
2012 
Full Data 
States 
Logit 
Model 
FeeRatio 0.0485∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ 0.0523∗ 0.0406∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗ 
  (0.0238) (0.0117) (0.0296) (0.0179) (0.0145) 
      
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0393∗ 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0538∗ 0.0350∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ 
  (0.0224) (0.0107) (0.0279) (0.0154) (0.0126) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0304 0.0115 0.0367 0.0128 0.0196+ 
  (0.0221) (0.0105) (0.0276) (0.0152) (0.0122) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0276 0.00864 0.0336 0.00954 0.0171 
  (0.0214) (0.0102) (0.0282) (0.0151) (0.0132) 
N 459546 2095408 1235761 1937363 2095408 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of the Medicaid-
to-Medicare fee ratio of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-
pregnant civilian adults aged 27-64, with either low-income or low-education 
attainment. The first part uses the fee ratio of 30 minutes’ new patient office visits; the 
second part uses that of 45 minutes’ new patient office visits; the third part uses that of 
15 minutes’ established patient office visits; and the fourth part uses that of 25 
minutes’ established patient office visits. Column 1 uses the fee ratios under FFS and 
the linear probability models (LPM) on the subsample of adults without high school 
degrees in all states and years of 2010-2014. Column 2 uses the fee ratio under both 
FFS &MC and the LPM on the subsample of adults with income below 250% of the 
FPL in all states and years. Column 3 uses the fee ratio under FFS and the LPM on the 
subsample of adults with income below 250% of the FPL in all states and years of 
2010-2013. Column 4 uses the fee ratios under FFS and the LPM on the subsample of 
adults with income below 250% of the FPL in the 41 states with the fee ratios available 
in all years. Column 5 uses the fee ratios under FFS and the logistic model on the 
subsample of adults with income below 250% of the FPL in all states and years. All 
regressions use state and year fixed effects, and state-specific linear yearly trend. Each 
column reports the coefficients on the fee ratios, except column 5 reports the marginal 
effects of the fee ratios. The fee ratios were calculated by the author using Medicaid 
and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected from state Medicaid agencies and the 
CMS. Main data is from ACS 2010-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
state level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + p<0.15. 
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Table 2.6: Subsample Analyses by Age and Parental Status 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 <= 50 > 50 Parents Childless Adults 
FeeRatio 0.0320∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 
  (0.0169) (0.0193) (0.0157) (0.0163) 
     
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0271∗ 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗ 0.0410∗∗∗ 
  (0.0144) (0.0183) (0.0136) (0.0149) 
     
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.00301 0.0462∗∗ 0.0105 0.0245∗ 
  (0.0134) (0.0200) (0.0151) (0.0135) 
     
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.000453 0.0436∗∗ 0.00916 0.0206 
  (0.0142) (0.0191) (0.0156) (0.0142) 
N 1286676 808732 1004426 1090982 
R-squared 0.147 0.131 0.177 0.125 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. Only the 
coefficients on the fee ratios are included. The first part uses the fee ratio of 30 
minutes’ new patient office visits; the second part uses that of 45 minutes’ new patient 
office visits; the third part uses that of 15 minutes’ established patient office visits; and 
the fourth part uses that of 25 minutes’ established patient office visits. Column 1 uses 
the subsample of adults aged 27-50, column 2 uses the subsample of adults aged 50-64, 
column 3 uses the subsample of adults with children living in the same household, and 
column 4 uses the subsample of childless adults. All regressions use the same 
individual and state level controls as in Table 2, state and year fixed effects and state-
specific linear yearly trend. The fee ratios were calculated by the author using 
Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected from state Medicaid agencies 
and the CMS. Main data is from ACS 2010-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the state level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + p<0.15. 
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Table 2.7: Subsample Analyses by Race and Metro Status 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 White African-American Rural Suburb CentralCity 
FeeRatio 0.0340∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗ 0.0264 0.0742∗ 
  (0.0152) (0.0283) (0.0177) (0.0251) (0.0372) 
      
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0322∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0410∗∗ 0.0221 0.0741∗∗ 
  (0.0139) (0.0277) (0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0342) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0170 0.0456 0.0271∗ 0.00812 0.0334 
  (0.0133) (0.0291) (0.0161) (0.0241) (0.0324) 
      
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio 0.0125 0.0518∗ 0.0188 0.00821 0.0250 
 (0.0144) (0.0286) (0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0362) 
N 1550170 364902 382197 440048 263791 
R-squared 0.124 0.143 0.129 0.128 0.173 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits on Medicaid coverage among non-pregnant 
civilian adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. Only the 
coefficients on the fee ratios are included. The first part uses the fee ratio of 30 
minutes’ new patient office visits; the second part uses that of 45 minutes’ new patient 
office visits; the third part uses that of 15 minutes’ established patient office visits; and 
the fourth part uses that of 25 minutes’ established patient office visits. Column 1 uses 
the subsample of white adults, column 2 uses the subsample of African-American 
adults, column 3 uses the subsample of adults not living in a metro area, column 4 uses 
the subsample of adults living in a metropolitan area but outside of its central city, and 
column 5 uses the subsample of adults living inside the central city. All regressions use 
state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear yearly trend. The fee ratios were 
calculated by the author using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected 
from state Medicaid agencies and the CMS. Main data is from ACS 2010-2014. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + 
p<0.15. 
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Table 2.8: Other Insurance Coverage Rates 
  Office Visit, New Patient, 30 Minutes 
 (1) (2) 
 Uninsured Private 
FeeRatio -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.00254 
  (0.0147) (0.0130) 
   
 Office Visit, New Patient, 45 Minutes 
FeeRatio -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.00272 
  (0.0144) (0.0124) 
   
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 15 Minutes 
FeeRatio -0.0323∗∗ 0.00430 
  (0.0138) (0.0128) 
   
 Office Visit, Established Patient, 25 Minutes 
FeeRatio -0.0305∗∗ 0.00647 
 (0.0142) (0.0132) 
N 2095408 2095408 
R-squared 0.0626 0.183 
Notes: The table presents the results of the linear probability models of Medicaid-to-Medicare 
fee ratios of patient office visits on the uninsured and privately insured status among non-
pregnant civilian adults aged 27-64, whose income is below 250% of the FPL. Only the 
coefficients on the fee ratios are included. The first part uses the fee ratio of 30 minutes’ new 
patient office visits; the second part uses that of 45 minutes’ new patient office visits; the third 
part uses that of 15 minutes’ established patient office visits; and the fourth part uses that of 25 
minutes’ established patient office visits. Column 1 uses the dependent variable of being 
uninsured, and column 2 uses that of being privately insured. All regressions use state and year 
fixed effects and state-specific linear yearly trend. The fee ratios were calculated by the author 
using Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates, collected from state Medicaid agencies and 
the CMS. Main data is from ACS 2010-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1, + p<0.15. 
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Chapter 3: Public Insurance and Birth Outcomes: Evidence from Medicaid 
Implementation 
3.1 Introduction 
Medicaid is one of the most important sources of health insurance for the 
disadvantaged population in the US. The goal of Medicaid is to provide qualified 
individuals access to health care services, to buffer negative shocks associated with 
adverse health events, and to improve their overall health. Many studies have evaluated 
Medicaid’s effectiveness in promoting health. For one specific population – pregnant 
women (and by implication, newborns) – studies have found mixed results. While Currie 
and Gruber (1996b) found an increase in Medicaid income eligibility threshold reduces 
the incidence low birth weight, Dave et al. (2010) showed that Medicaid has a small and 
statistically insignificant impact on birth outcomes. Both studies investigate the Medicaid 
expansion period during the 1980s – 1990s. During this period, Medicaid income 
eligibility threshold for pregnant women and children under one-year-old expands from 
100% of the federal poverty line (FPL) in 1986 (Medicaid & Medicare Milestones 1937 – 
201529) to 133% of FPL in April 1990 (Currie and Gruber 1996b).  
Several reasons may have contributed to the lack of consistent empirical evidence 
for the causal relationship between Medicaid and birth outcomes. First, the Medicaid 
expansions in the 1980s caused non-negligible crowd-out of private health insurance. 
Such crowd-out resulted in little change in the actual uninsured rate, thus birth outcome 
was not improved during this period (Dave et al. 2010). Second, the identification of 
                                                          
29 See https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/Downloads/Medicare-and-
Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf. 
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existing studies is based on state-by-year expansions, which may suffer from potential 
policy endogeneity (Aizer and Grogger 2003). States’ expansions of Medicaid are 
voluntary. Economic thrift enables states to expand Medicaid but also broadly improves 
coverage and access, which might create a spurious correlation between eligibility 
expansion and health outcomes (Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein 2012). Because of these 
two obstacles, the Medicaid provision period provides a better setting to estimate the 
impact of insurance coverage on health outcome. Surprisingly, there has been very little 
research focusing on this period of Medicaid. Recently, Goodman-Bacon (2018) found 
that Medicaid provision reduced mortality among nonwhite infants and children in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
In this study, we seek to provide new evidence on the impact of Medicaid on birth 
outcomes by addressing the above concerns in three ways. First, we focused on the 
population eligible for Medicaid during the initial rollout of Medicaid to mitigate crowd-
out. For one reason, private health insurance coverage rate was much lower among 
people who would be eligible for Medicaid upon its provision than that among those to 
be eligible through Medicaid expansion. For the other, women eligible for Medicaid 
during the Medicaid introduction did not reduce their labor supply (Strumpf 2011), one 
potential mechanism of crowd-out, whereas those eligible for Medicaid through labor 
expansions in the 1980s – 90s did (Dave et al. 2015). Compared to new enrollees from 
later expansions, the first group of Medicaid enrollees was the most disadvantaged 
population, who had less income and were more sensitive to better health care. Second, 
we purged biases from policy endogeneity by utilizing within-state-level variation. 
Specifically, we predicted the probability of being uninsured, thus being affected by 
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Medicaid provision using the 1963 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data. Third, 
the initial rollout of Medicaid took place within a short period, leaving less concern with 
policy endogeneity. Seventy-three (73%) states rolled out Medicaid from the beginning 
of 1966 to the end of 1967.  
We have three main findings. First, Medicaid increased the probability of labor 
delivery in a hospital rather than with a physician or a midwife, suggesting better quality 
care during labor delivery because of Medicaid. Second, Medicaid increased the birth 
weight on average and potentially reduced the probability of having low birth weight 
babies. Third, these positive effects of Medicaid were mainly driven by nonwhite and 
unmarried mothers and those aged 30-49. These results provide an important contribution 
to the literature on Medicaid’s impact on health outcomes. 
3.2 Background  
3.2.1  Insurance Coverage before Medicaid 
Prior to the implementation of Medicaid, the coverage rate of private insurance 
was very low. Among people with income less than $2,000 in 1959, only 8.9% had 
insurance that covered doctor visits, and less than one-third had a hospital or surgical 
insurance (Goodman-Bacon 2018). Also, the percentage of adults who received charity 
care in 1960 was 8% at most (Morgan et al. 1962). To address the lack of insurance 
coverage, Social Security Act of 1935 established a public assistance program for those 
unable to work and thus unable to obtain employer-provided health insurance. Later, this 
program was extended to the medically needy, the aged, the blind, the disabled, and 
single women with children. Federal share of the program cost was increased after the 
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Kerr-Mills Act in 1960.30 However, only 1% of children received aid on health care by 
1963 (Goodman-Bacon 2018).  
3.2.2  Introduction of Medicaid Program 
Expanding the goal of the Kerr-Mills Act, Medicaid was signed into law by 
President Lyndon Johnson in 1965. It was designed to replace the earlier federal 
programs granting states to provide medical care to welfare recipients and the aged. 
Federal and state jointly fund Medicaid with a significantly more generous matching rate 
than that under the Kerr-Mills Act. Federal contributions to each state are based on a 
matching formula, which depends on state per capita income. The higher the state’s 
willingness to finance Medicaid coverage of medical services, the higher the federal 
contributions will be in that state.  
Medicaid targets low-income people. Prior to the 1980s, only very low-income 
families with dependent children, poor elderly, disabled individuals, and the “medically 
needy” were eligible for Medicaid. Eligibility rule required that applicants’ income and 
asset or other resources must be within some limits. The major way for non-elderly, 
mainly low-income families with children, to be eligible for Medicaid before the 1980s 
was through being the beneficiaries of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program. Families who were eligible for cash welfare payments under former 
the AFDC program rules were automatically eligible for Medicaid until 1987. The 
majority of children (89%) covered by Medicaid in 1976 were eligible for the AFDC 
(Goodman-Bacon 2018). Being eligible for Medicaid provided both poor and medically-
                                                          
30 Both State and Federal governments share the cost of the program. 
53 
 
needy individuals with insurance against medical debt, avoiding personal bankruptcy 
(Gross and Notowidigdo 2011, Finkelstein et al. 2012).  
To qualify for AFDC, individuals must meet not only states’ AFDC income and 
asset requirements, but also the categorical eligibility requirements. Categorical 
eligibility rule restricts the AFDC to those low-income families with “dependent 
children” only. Whether “dependent children” includes an unborn child or not was not 
clearly defined under the Social Security Act of 1935. The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (DHEW), as the regulation agency of Medicaid at that time, 
treated the aid to the unborn child to be optional for states participating the AFDC 
program (1975). As a result, around 20 states did not provide aid to first-time mothers 
because their programs do not cover unborn child (Davis and Schoen 1978, Grossman 
and Jacobowitz 1981).  
3.3 Literature Review 
Most of the previous research in the area of Medicaid’s impact on birth outcome 
focuses on the Medicaid expansion period during the 1980s and 1990s. Currie and Gruber 
(1996a) studied the period between 1984 and 1992, during which AFDC qualification for 
children of 0 – 5 and first time pregnant women coverage became mandatory for the first 
time. They found that the take-up rate among otherwise uninsured children was much 
lower than expected. Nevertheless, the expansion of Medicaid eligibility significantly 
increased the utilization of medical care. They also found that the change in eligibility 
rule reduced the incidence of infant mortality and low birth weight (Currie and Gruber 
1996b). One-fifth of the increase in eligibility under overall expansion was correlated 
with a 7% reduction in infant mortality rate and a 2% reduction in the incidence of low 
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birth weight. In contrast, Dave et al. (2010) found the Medicaid expansion crowded-out 
private insurance coverage by at least 55%, caused a small reduction (10% - 15%) in the 
uninsured rate of pregnant women and little impact on prenatal care utilization and birth 
weight (1% increase). Yazici and Kaestner (2000) re-estimated the magnitude of 
crowding-out during the same period and found a much smaller magnitude of crowding-
out, 18.9%. Based on their estimation, the increase in insurance coverage rate because of 
Medicaid expansion was 2.5%. Goodman-Bacon (2018) summarized that the estimated 
impact of the expansion on insurance coverage rate ranged from 0 to 3 percentage points 
for pregnant women and from a slight decrease to a rise of between 2.4 to 4 percentage 
points for children.  
More recent research investigated the issue of public insurance take-up rate and 
private insurance crowd-out rate with the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP). Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) found that around 9% of eligible children 
enrolled in this program, with a take-up rate of 5.4% and a crowd-out estimate of 10%. 
Bansak and Raphael (2007) found that the take-up rate of SCHIP varied a lot depending 
on states’ policy designs, and the overall take-up rate was around 10%. They did not find 
evidence of the states’ policy design affecting the degree of crowd-out of private health 
insurance coverage. Koch (2013) applied regression discontinuity method to series of 
income eligibility thresholds of SCHIP across states and found 17% average crowd-out 
rate among the group of children, 60% of whom were covered by private plans. This 
crowd-out rate decreased as the income threshold of a marginally eligible child rose. 
Strumpf (2011) explored the potential mechanism of crowd-out through pregnant 
women’s labor supply during Medicaid introduction and did not find any impact. Based 
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on Dave et al. (2015)’s estimation, a 20-percentage-point increase in Medicaid eligibility 
among unmarried women without high school education and who gave birth in the past 
year was associated with a 13 – 16% reduction in the probability of being employed 
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  
In general, the relationship between Medicaid coverage and health care 
utilization, as well as health outcomes, has been discussed for many years. Literature has 
found some evidence of a positive relationship between the two (Kaestner, Joyce, and 
Racine 2001, Buchmueller et al. 2005, Dafny and Gruber 2005). In contrast to those aged 
7-9, children aged 2-6 benefited from public insurance coverage; Medicaid expansion 
reduced the incidence of ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations among the young 
children from near poor areas (Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine 2001). Dafny and Gruber 
(2005) analyzed the impact of Medicaid expansion during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
on the child hospitalizations and found a ten percentage-point rise in Medicaid eligibility 
led to 8.1% increase in the unavoidable hospitalization rate. Buchmueller et al. (2005) 
found that insurance coverage increased outpatient (associated with preventive care) and 
inpatient utilization for both children and adults.  
3.4 Data and Sample 
This study mainly uses two datasets. One is the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS). Conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) since 1960, the 
NHIS is a nationally representative survey that collects information on the distribution of 
health on the noninstitutionalized civilian population in the U.S. We used person-level 
file from NHIS of 1963, which provides information before any states implemented 
Medicaid. It contains respondents’ private health insurance coverage status, including 
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doctor visit insurance, hospital insurance, and surgical insurance. It also contains detailed 
information on an individual’s demographics, educational attainment, and income. 
The other dataset is the Vital Statistics Natality birth data from NCHS, which 
collects information from birth certificates filed in Vital Statistics Offices across U.S. 
Public available data is available for each calendar year after 1968. We collected the birth 
data of babies born between 1968 and 1973 in the U.S., which covers the Medicaid 
implementation dates in most states (from 1966 to 1972).31 We generated sampling 
weights based on the reporting status of each state in each year.32 The data contains 
information on both mothers and babies, including mother’s age, race, marital status, 
length of gestation, the month when prenatal visits begin,33 birth attendant, and baby’s 
date of birth, gender, race, and birth weight among others. The conception month was 
calculated by subtracting the length of gestation34 from the date of birth of a mother. The 
month of conception ranges from December 1966 to July 1973. Third, we merged the 
Medicaid effective date of each state from Boudreaux, Golberstein, and McAlpine (2016) 
(Table 3.3) to the birth dataset based on months of conception.35  
                                                          
31 All the states including District of Columbia implemented Medicaid through July 1972, except Arizona, 
which didn’t provide Medicaid until October 1982.  
32 Prior to 1972, all states reported 50% of birth certificates to NCHS. After 1972, states participating in the 
Vital Statistics Cooperative Program (VSCP) reported 100% of birth records, while the rest still reported 
50%. 
33 Data of prenatal care utilization is available after 1969. 
34 We used national average gestation weeks of the year when mothers’ gestation weeks were missing if the 
mothers were living in states that didn’t report last menstrual periods in that year. We also replaced the 
gestation weeks of mothers, who didn’t state their last menstrual period, using state average of the 
corresponding year. Results with and without missing gestation weeks’ replacement are not significantly 
different from each other.  
35 If conception happens in or after the month of Medicaid implementation, variable Medicaid was coded as 
one, otherwise, zero. Twenty-five states implemented Medicaid during the sample period, including New 
Mexico providing Medicaid in December 1966.  
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We focused on two sets of outcomes. One is health care utilization during 
pregnancy and delivery, measured by the timing of prenatal care initiation and the 
methods of labor delivery. The other is the birth outcomes of mothers and their newborns, 
measured by gestation length and birth weight. Specifically, we categorized birthweight 
in several ways, including BIRTHWEIGHT in grams, a binary variable 
LOWBIRTHWEGIHT, indicating if birth weight is less than 2,500 grams, a binary 
variable VLOWBIRTHWEIGHT, indicating if birth weight is less than 1,500 grams, and 
a binary variable VVLOWBIRTHWEIGHT, indicating birth weight is less than 1,000 
grams. Fixed effects for age, quarter, year, and state are used for all regressions.36 
Standard errors are clustered by state.  
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the two datasets. The left half of Table 
3.1 shows the summary statistics of the females from 10 to 49 years’ old in the NHIS data 
of 1963. Their average age was 28, 89% of them were white, and 53% were married. The 
right half presents the statistics of the Vital Statistics Natality birth data of 1968 – 73.37 
Compared to those in NHIS data, the females in birth data was approximately younger by 
three years, three percentage points less likely to be white, and 37 percentage points more 
likely to be married. Also, Medicaid was provided at or before the month of pregnancy 
for 88% of the women. Among them, 67% were living in metropolitan counties. 
Regarding the timing of prenatal care initiation, 70% of pregnant women started their 
prenatal care visits in the first trimester, 93% started prenatal visits before the third 
trimester, and 2% did not have any prenatal visits during pregnancy. Regarding the 
                                                          
36 Cell fixed effects based on each cell created using white dummy, marriage status dummy, and age groups, 
were tried. Results with cell fixed effects and without them are not substantially different from each other. 
37 Records with the predicted probabilities of private insurance coverage being 0 or 1 (6%) were dropped.  
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methods of labor delivery, 99% of the babies were delivered in hospitals while the rest 
were delivered by a physician or midwife. Regarding birth outcomes, the mothers’ 
gestation period length was 39.5 weeks on average, and 9% of them had pre-term birth. 
Babies weighed 3,289 grams at birth on average, but 8% of them weighed less than 2,500 
grams, 1% weighed less than 1,500 grams, and 0.5% weighed less than 1,000 grams.  
3.5 Empirical Methodology 
The empirical objective of this study is to examine the effects of Medicaid on the 
use of prenatal care and birth outcomes. There are several difficulties to establish 
causality. First, the health conditions of mothers with and without insurance can be 
different. Medicaid covers low-income single mother, who has children, and who has 
lower nutritional intake in a worse home environment during pregnancy. Without 
accounting for the difference in mothers eligible for Medicaid and not would lead to a 
downward bias in the estimates of Medicaid’s impact. Second, bias could come from 
reverse causality of health insurance coverage. Lower health status could lead to higher 
cost of medical care, thus lower income, making the family eligible for Medicaid. Third, 
eligible mothers could choose to apply for Medicaid or not, depending on their preference 
for the health of themselves and their babies. This unobserved preference could affect the 
degree to which they take care of themselves during pregnancy and thus birth outcomes.  
To causally identify the effect of Medicaid on birth outcomes, we adopted a 
difference-in-differences (DID) strategy exploiting two sources of variation. One is state-
level variation in Medicaid rollout, and the other is individual-level variation in the 
probability of being treated by Medicaid. The idea of DID is to compare the pre- and 
post-Medicaid difference between the birth outcomes of mothers who were treated by 
59 
 
Medicaid and those of mothers who were not. Also, we simulated the probability of 
enrolling in Medicaid, rather than using the actual coverage Medicaid status, due to the 
unobserved preference. Those who would otherwise be uninsured are expected more 
likely to be affected by Medicaid.  
First, we generated the likelihood of insurance coverage before Medicaid using 
the NHIS data of 1963. We used doctor visit insurance as the proxy for private insurance 
to predict the propensity of being eligible for private insurance for each woman aged 
between 10 – 49. We adopted the following specification. 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼8𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼12𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼13𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼14𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛼15𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖 
(1) 
In this equation, 𝑖 indexes for an individual woman. INSURED, MARRIED, and WHITE 
are binary variables, indicating if the woman was covered by doctor visit insurance, 
married and white. AGE and REGION are categorical variables of the women’s age and 
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census region. We predicted the propensity of being eligible for private insurance for 
each group of women based on the value taken by each control variable from equation 
(1).38 This propensity was matched to each baby in the birth data based on their mothers’ 
socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Second, we assumed that private insurance is the only type of insurance available 
before Medicaid. Based on this assumption, the probability of being uninsured 
(UNINSURED) and being treated by Medicaid is, 
 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷̂ 𝑗 = 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷̂ 𝑖 = 1 − 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷̂ 𝑖 (2) 
Third, we estimate the DID model using the simulated intensity of Medicaid 
treatment. Formally, we estimated the following model. 
 
𝑦𝑗𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑗̂ + 𝛽2𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑗𝑠𝑚
+  𝛽3𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑗̂ ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑗𝑠𝑚 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑚 + 𝜂𝑎
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜃𝑞 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑚 
(3) 
In this equation, 𝑗 indexes the baby, 𝑠 the state of birth, 𝑚 the conception month, 𝑎 the 
age of his (her) mother, 𝑞 the conception quarter, and 𝑡 the conception year. Policy 
variable MEDICAIDjsm is a binary variable, indicating Medicaid availability at the month 
of conception.39 From equation (2), UNINSUREDĵ  is a continuous variable, indicating the 
probability of being uninsured before Medicaid provision and the intensity of being 
treated by Medicaid once provided. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, which captures the 
impact of the Medicaid provision. In terms of other relevant aspects of our model, 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑚 
                                                          
38 Probit model was also used to predict the propensity of private insurance coverage. The results are not 
significantly different from those using the linear probability model.  
39 Since Medicaid stays once it is implemented, babies are exposed to Medicaid treatment after the state’s 
implementation month. 
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represents individual level characteristics, including binary variables indicating if the 
baby was male (Male), if he (she) was born in a metropolitan county 
(METROPOLITAN), and if the mother was white (WHITE). The model also includes 
different levels of fixed effects, including the mother’s age (𝜂𝑎), state of residency (𝛿𝑠), 
a birth quarter (𝜃𝑞), and birth year (𝜆𝑡).
40  
3.6 Results 
3.6.1  Predicted Uninsured Rate 
Based on equation (1), we used the marital status, race, age, as well as census 
region from NHIS 1963 to make the prediction and matched to the main dataset birth data 
of 1968 – 1973.41 Specifically, we predicted the probability of doctor visit insurance 
coverage for four distinct groups in four census regions: white and married women, white 
and unmarried women, nonwhite and married women, as well as nonwhite and unmarried 
women (Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 shows that the mothers’ private insurance coverage 
probabilities were mostly below 25% in all regions except West. This figure shows 
results consistent with the fact that during this period, married women were more inclined 
to have health insurance than unmarried women (Verbrugge 1979). 
The predicted likelihood of doctor visit insurance coverage was then converted to 
the probability of being uninsured without Medicaid, thus the likelihood of being treated 
by Medicaid. In Table 3.2, we showed the actual uninsured rate of females 10 – 49 in 
1963 NHIS data and predicted uninsured rate in Vital Statistics Natality Birth data of 
                                                          
40 Previous literature finds high correlation between birth quarter and birth outcome (Lam and Miron 1994, 
Pitt and Sigle 1998, Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001, Bobak and Gjonca 2001). 
41 For states that don’t include legitimacy (marriage status) information on birth certificates, or girls less than 
17-year-old, we use race, age, census region to make a prediction. These observations account for 3.4% of 
the sample. 
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1968 – 1973. In 1963, 83% of these females were not covered by doctor visit insurance. 
Compared to the actual uninsured rate, the predicted uninsured rate is very similar, and its 
variance is much smaller among the study population. 
3.6.2  The Effect of Medicaid on Health Care Utilization and Birth Outcomes 
3.6.2.1 Health Care Utilization 
We began with full sample analyses of health care utilization. Table 3.4, columns 
(1) – (3) present the results of prenatal care starting before the end of the first trimester, 
second trimester, and third trimester. The results show no significant impact of Medicaid 
on these outcomes. Column (4) presents the results of birth in a hospital (versus with a 
physician or midwife). The first row shows that uninsured pregnant women had lower 
probabilities of delivering babies in hospitals before Medicaid provision. Specifically, a 
10-percentage-point increase in the probability of being uninsured was associated with a 
0.44-percentage-point reduction in the probability of delivering babies in hospitals before 
Medicaid. The second row shows the average likelihood of labor delivery in hospitals 
among all women decreased by 2.48% after Medicaid provision. The third row shows the 
impact of Medicaid implementation on prenatal care utilization among those who were 
more likely to be treated by Medicaid. With a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of being uninsured prior to Medicaid, Medicaid implementation increased the 
probability of delivering babies in a hospital by 0.41-percentage-point (0.4% increase 
relative to the mean). Regarding control variables, mothers who were white or living in a 
metropolitan county were more likely to deliver babies in a hospital rather than with a 
physician or a midwife.  
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3.6.2.2 Birth Outcomes 
The previous section shows that Medicaid improved the quality of care during 
labor delivery among those who were more likely to be treated. This section examines if 
Medicaid improved birth outcomes. Medicaid had no statistically significant impact on 
gestational length (column (1) of Table 3.5) or the probability of preterm labor (column 
(2)). These results are consistent with the findings in Table 3.4 that Medicaid had no 
impact on prenatal care utilization. Column (3) – (6) presents birth weight outcomes. 
Uninsured pregnant women were more likely to have babies with low birth weight before 
Medicaid provision (row (1) of column (3) – (6)). A 10-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of being uninsured before Medicaid was associated with a 51.65 grams’ 
reduction in birth weight, a 0.16-percentage-point increase in the probability of babies 
having birth weight below 2,500 grams, a 0.05-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of babies having birth weight below 1,500 grams, and a 0.03-percentage-point 
increase in the probability of babies having birth weight below 1,000 grams. Row (2) 
shows that the average birth weight reduced by 25.77 grams after Medicaid provision. 
Also, with a 10-percentage-point increase in the probability of being uninsured prior to 
Medicaid, thus being treated by Medicaid, Medicaid provision increased the birth weight 
by 24.28 grams (reflecting approximately 0.7% increase relative to the mean) but had 
little impact on the probability of giving birth to babies with birth weight less than 2,500 
grams (row (3)). Compared to female birth, male birth weight was 123 grams higher and 
1.31% lower probability of having low birth weight (row (4)). White mothers’ babies had 
201.8 grams’ higher birth weight and were 5.59% less likely to have low birth weight 
than nonwhite mothers (row (5)). Mothers living in metropolitan counties had babies 
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whose birth weight were 30.19 grams’ lower than those not living in metropolitan 
counties (row(6)).   
3.6.3 Robustness Checks using Birth Order 
We tested the main results using subsample analyses separated by birth order. 
Since approximately 20 states did not provide benefit to first-time mothers, we expected a 
stronger effect of Medicaid on later-born babies than on first-born babies. Table 3.6 
presents the results of the timing to initiate prenatal care on the left and those of labor 
delivery on the right using the coefficients on the interaction terms only in equation (3). 
The estimates on the prenatal care initiations in first and second trimesters among later 
born babies are larger and positive while those among first-born babies are smaller and 
mixed. This suggests that Medicaid had relatively stronger effects on prenatal care 
utilization among later-born babies than first-born ones. There is not much difference in 
the Medicaid effect on labor delivery between first and later born babies.  
Table 3.7 presents the birth outcomes using the coefficients of the interaction 
terms only in equation (3). Consistent with the pattern of prenatal care utilization, the 
results show Medicaid ‘s benefit on gestational age measured in weeks and premature 
labor is stronger among later born babies. Further, Medicaid reduced the probability of 
women having low birth weight babies among later born babies only. With a 10-
percentage-point increase in the probability of being uninsured before Medicaid, 
Medicaid provision decreased the probability of giving birth with weight less than 2,500 
grams by 0.12-percentage-point among later-born babies. Overall, the findings of this 
robustness check support our main results.  
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3.6.4 Extension 
Findings in the main analysis suggest that Medicaid provision led to a better 
quality of care during labor delivery among pregnant women and higher birth weight 
among their babies who were more likely to be treated by Medicaid. These effects mainly 
work through later born babies. In this section, we explore the heterogeneous effects 
across various groups of sub-population separated by race, marital status, and age.  
Table 3.8 presents the subsample analyses’ results of labor delivery on the left and 
those of birth weight on the right. The labor delivery quality improvement mainly came 
from nonwhite instead of white mothers. With a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of being uninsured, Medicaid provision increased the probability of delivering 
babies in hospitals by 0.4-percentage-point among nonwhite mothers while had no impact 
on white mothers. The Medicaid’s effect on labor delivery quality increase was larger in 
magnitude among unmarried mothers than married ones. This effect existed across all age 
groups and was largest among teenage mothers, whose probability of delivering babies in 
hospitals increased by 0.89-percentage-point after Medicaid provision.  
The subanalyses of birth weight show a similar pattern of heterogeneity. The birth 
weight increase was concentrated on nonwhite mothers. With a 10-percentage-point 
increase in the probability of being uninsured, Medicaid provision increased the birth 
weight by 41.78 grams among nonwhite mothers while had no impact on white mothers. 
The Medicaid had a larger effect in magnitude on unmarried mothers’ birth weight than 
married mothers’. Across age groups, however, Medicaid improved birth weight among 
mothers aged 30-49 only. With a 10-percentage-point increase in the probability of being 
uninsured, Medicaid provision increased the birth weight by 50.79 grams among these 
66 
 
mothers. Overall, the subsample analyses show that the effects of Medicaid on health 
care utilization and birth outcomes are stronger among nonwhite and unmarried mothers.  
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study examines the impact of Medicaid provision on prenatal care and birth 
outcomes using both NHIS and Vital Statistics Natality birth data from NCHS. By 
focusing on the population during the initial rollout period of Medicaid, we mitigated the 
crowd-out from private insurance to Medicaid and improved the accuracy of the 
estimates on Medicaid’s impact. We also exploited individual-level variation, using 
simulated propensity of being treated by Medicaid, to overcome unobserved preference 
towards public insurance enrollment. This study contributes to the current literature by 
providing the following evidence. First, Medicaid provision caused a higher probability 
of labor delivery in a hospital rather than with a physician or midwife. Second, Medicaid 
increased the birth weight on average. With a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of being treated by Medicaid, Medicaid implementation increased the 
likelihood of delivering babies in a hospital by 0.41-percentage-point and increased the 
birth weight by 24.28 grams on average. These effects mainly came from later born rather 
than first-born babies. Third, the positive effects of Medicaid provision on prenatal care 
utilization and health outcomes were concentrated among nonwhite, unmarried mothers, 
and those aged 30-49.  
Overall, the findings in this study made several contributions to the literature on 
the impact of Medicaid on health outcomes. First, Medicaid provision improved health 
care utilization among pregnant women, improving the quality of care at labor delivery 
by changing the way of delivery from with a physician or a midwife to in a hospital. 
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Second, the improvements in the quality of labor delivery might increase birth weight and 
potentially reduced low birth weight incidence. Third, these benefits of Medicaid 
provision were mainly obtained by nonwhite and unmarried mothers and those aged 30-
49.  
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Figure 3.1: Predicted Doctor Visit Insurance Coverage Rate 
 
Notes: The figure shows the predicted doctor visit insurance coverage rate among 
mothers aged between 10 and 49 from 1968 – 73 birth records. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Description NHIS Birth Data 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD 
AGE Age of female/mother 36,059 27.75 12.29 10,118,378 24.82 5.52 
WHITE Dummy, 1 if female is white, 0 otherwise 36,059 0.89 0.32 10,118,378 0.86 0.35 
MARRIED Dummy, 1 if female is married 36,059 0.53 0.50 6,729,317 0.90 0.30 
MEDICAID 
Dummy, 1 if Medicaid is available at the 
month of pregnancy    
10,118,378 0.88 0.33 
MALE Dummy, 1 if the child is male    10,118,378 0.51 0.50 
METROPOLITAN 
Dummy, 1 if living in the metropolitan 
county    
10,118,378 0.67 0.47 
FIRSTTRIMESTER 
Dummy, 1 if prenatal care begins in the 1st 
trimester    
6,737,972 0.70 0.46 
SECONDTRIMESTER 
Dummy, 1 if prenatal care begins in the 1st 
or 2nd trimester    
6,737,972 0.93 0.25 
THIRDTRIMESTER 
Dummy, 1 if prenatal care begins in 1st, 2nd, 
or 3rd trimester    
6,737,972 0.98 0.12 
BIRTHINHOSPITAL Dummy, 1 if labor is in hospital    10,118,378 0.99 0.09 
GESTATIONWEEK Gestation period length in weeks    6,468,345 39.50 2.76 
PREMATURE Dummy, 1 if gestation period is < 37 weeks    6,468,357 0.09 0.29 
BIRTHWEIGHT Birth weight in grams    10,080,296 3289 587 
LOWBIRTHWEGIHT Dummy, 1 if birth weight is < 2,500 grams    10,080,296 0.08 0.27 
VLOWBIRTHWEIGHT Dummy, 1 if birth weight is < 1,500 grams    10,080,296 0.01 0.11 
VVLOWBIRTHWEIGHT Dummy, 1 if birth weight is < 1,000 grams    10,080,296 0.005 0.07 
Notes: Sample contains women aged 10-49 from 1963 NHIS and 1968 - 1973 Birth Data. Medicaid dummy is predicted using 
gestation weeks, whose missing values are replaced by state or national average (see main text for detailed explanation). 
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Table 3.2: Likelihood of Insurance Coverage 
Variable  Description N Mean SD 
Based on NHIS 1963 Data       
UNINSURED Dummy, 1 if female does not have 
doctor visit insurance coverage 
36,059 0.83 0.38 
Predicted and Matched to Birth Data 1968 - 1973 
UNINSURED Dummy, 1 if female does not have 
doctor visit insurance coverage based 
on prediction 
10,118,378 0.83 0.10 
Notes: Doctor visit insurance coverage was obtained from 1963 NHIS. The sample is 
restricted to women between 10 and 49 years' old. Predicted insurance coverage was 
matched to 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. 
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Table 3.3: Medicaid Implementation Dates of States 
State Name  Implementation Date State Name  Implementation Date 
Alabama 1/1/1970 Montana 7/1/1967 
Alaska 7/1/1972 Nebraska 7/1/1966 
Arizona 10/1/1982 Nevada 7/1/1967 
Arkansas 10/1/1970 New Hampshire 7/1/1967 
California 3/1/1966 New Jersey 1/1/1970 
Colorado 1/1/1969 New Mexico 12/1/1966 
Connecticut 7/1/1966 New York 5/1/1966 
Delaware 10/1/1966 North Carolina 1/1/1970 
District of Columbia 7/1/1968 North Dakota 1/1/1966 
Florida 1/1/1970 Ohio 7/1/1966 
Georgia 10/1/1967 Oklahoma 1/1/1966 
Hawaii 1/1/1966 Oregon 7/1/1967 
Idaho 7/1/1966 Pennsylvania 1/1/1966 
Illinois 1/1/1966 Rhode Island 7/1/1966 
Indiana 1/1/1970 South Carolina 7/1/1968 
Iowa 7/1/1967 South Dakota 10/1/1967 
Kansas 6/1/1967 Tennessee 1/1/1969 
Kentucky 7/1/1966 Texas 9/1/1967 
Louisiana 7/1/1966 Utah 7/1/1966 
Maine 7/1/1966 Vermont 7/1/1966 
Maryland 7/1/1966 Virginia 7/1/1969 
Massachusetts 9/1/1966 Washington 7/1/1966 
Michigan 10/1/1966 West Virginia 7/1/1966 
Minnesota 1/1/1966 Wisconsin 7/1/1966 
Mississippi 1/1/1970 Wyoming 7/1/1967 
Missouri 10/1/1967   
Notes: The data comes from (Boudreaux, Golberstein, and McAlpine 2016).  
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Table 3.4: Healthcare Utilization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
First 
Trimester 
Second 
Trimester 
Third 
Trimester 
Birth in 
Hospital 
          
UNINSURED -0.129 -0.0501 0.00993 -0.0441*** 
 (0.0816) (0.0660) (0.0232) (0.0132) 
MEDICAID -0.00780 0.00568 0.0193 -0.0248** 
 (0.0687) (0.0541) (0.0184) (0.00960) 
UNINSURED* 
MEDICAID 0.00562 -0.00499 -0.0244 0.0414*** 
 (0.0811) (0.0648) (0.0224) (0.0140) 
BOY -0.00286*** 0.000806*** 0.000218** 0.000369*** 
 (0.000340) (0.000183) (9.17e-05) (0.000127) 
WHITE 0.203*** 0.0681*** 0.0232*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0185) (0.00864) (0.00363) (0.00812) 
METROPOLITAN 0.0472*** 0.00778* -0.000357 0.0102*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00393) (0.000944) (0.00266) 
     
N 6,737,972 6,737,972 6,737,972 10,118,378 
R-squared 0.082 0.034 0.015 0.032 
Notes: 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. All estimates are weighted 
using sampling weights, and standard errors are clustered on the state of birth. All 
regressions use age, quarter, year, state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.5: Birth Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Gestation 
Week 
Premature 
Labor 
Birth 
Weight 
Weight < 
2,500 
Weight < 
1,500 
Weight < 
1,000 
              
UNINSURED -0.0576 -0.00123 -51.65*** 0.0161*** 0.00494*** 0.00309*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0110) (11.86) (0.00416) (0.00170) (0.000906) 
MEDICAID -0.0606 -0.00283 -25.77** 0.00400 0.00167 0.00109 
 (0.0619) (0.00859) (10.51) (0.00372) (0.00161) (0.000801) 
UNINSURED* 
MEDICAID 0.00169 0.0143 24.28* -0.00336 -0.00152 -0.00111 
 (0.0773) (0.0123) (12.81) (0.00441) (0.00195) (0.000988) 
BOY -0.131*** 0.00875*** 123.0*** -0.0131*** 0.000285*** 9.16e-05** 
 (0.00367) (0.000257) (0.758) (0.000334) (7.46e-05) (3.83e-05) 
WHITE 0.784*** -0.0738*** 201.8*** -0.0559*** -0.0110*** -0.00547*** 
 (0.0401) (0.00451) (4.877) (0.00148) (0.000490) (0.000293) 
METROPOLITAN -0.0564*** -0.000884 -30.19*** 0.00401*** 0.00114*** 0.000805*** 
 (0.0152) (0.000796) (3.263) (0.000471) (0.000208) (0.000156) 
       
N 6,468,345 6,468,357 10,080,296 10,080,296 10,080,296 10,080,296 
R-squared 0.023 0.018 0.040 0.010 0.003 0.001 
Notes: 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. All estimates are weighted using sampling weights. All regressions use age, 
quarter, year, state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state of birth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6: Subsample Analysis of Prenatal Care Utilization by Birth Order 
Prenatal Care Begins in Trimester   Labor Delivery 
Subgroup   First Second  Third  Subgroup  In Hospital 
Birth Order     Birth Order  
First Born 0.0248 -0.00538 -0.0227  First Born 0.0555*** 
[2,560,227] (0.105) (0.0667) (0.0217)  [3,803,793] (0.0198) 
Later Born 0.0347 0.0254 -0.00701  Later Born 0.0518*** 
[4,177,745] (0.0735) (0.0586) (0.0162)  [6,314,585] (0.0159) 
Notes: 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. Each estimate is the 
coefficient of interaction term based on a corresponding subsample regression. 
Observation number of each regression is reported in square brackets. These 
regressions use the same sampling weights, controls, and fixed effects as full sample 
analysis. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered by states. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3.7: Subsample Analysis of Birth Outcomes by Birth Order 
Subgroup  Gestation Weeks Premature Labor   Birth Weight < 2,500 < 1,500 < 1,000 
Birth Order Birth Order 
First Born -0.0989 0.0148 First Born 20.51 0.0107 0.000731 -0.00129 
[2,448,683] (0.0911) (0.0124) [3,791,026] (13.87) (0.00702) (0.00240) (0.00120) 
Later Born 0.0674 0.00755 Later Born 13.01 -0.0117** -0.00340 -0.00154 
[4,019,662] (0.107) (0.0147) [6,289,270] (11.62) (0.00489) (0.00240) (0.00123) 
Notes: 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. Each estimate is the coefficient of interaction term based on a corresponding 
subsample regression. Observation number of each regression is reported in square brackets. These regressions use the same 
sampling weights, controls, and fixed effects as full sample analysis. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered by states. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8: Subsample Analyses by Race/ethnicity, Marriage Status, and Age Groups 
Subgroup  
Labor Delivery in 
Hospital Subgroup  
Birth weight in 
Grams 
Race/ethnicity  Race/ethnicity  
White -0.00228 White -1.270 
[8,669,322] (0.00269) [8,640,028] (21.02) 
Non-White 0.0403*** Non-White 41.78** 
[1,449,056] (0.0132) [1,440,268] (17.41) 
Marriage Status  Marriage Status  
Married 0.00735 Married 20.23 
[6,034,228] (0.00639) [6,018,077] (16.52) 
Unmarried 0.0110 Unmarried 36.61 
[695,089] (0.0234) [692,522] (29.85) 
Age Groups  Age Groups  
Teenage 0.0889*** Teenage 14.90 
[1,613,180] (0.0232) [1,606,489] (14.98) 
20s 0.0335*** 20s 15.88 
[6,627,693] (0.0115) [6,604,059] (17.43) 
30-49 0.0472*** 30-49 50.79** 
[1,877,505] (0.0157) [1,869,748] (21.75) 
Notes: 1968 - 1973 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. Each estimate is the coefficient 
of interaction term based on a corresponding subsample regression. Observation 
number of each regression is reported in square brackets. These regressions use the 
same sampling weights, controls, and fixed effects as full sample analysis. Standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered by states. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Chapter 4: Does the Arrival of a Registered Sex Offender Hurt Property Values? 
Evidence from Maryland 2008 – 2018 
4.1 Introduction 
In response to some horrendous sex crimes towards children, two federal laws 
established the requirement of sex offender registration and community notification 
requirements in the US. The Jacob Wetterling Act in 1994 (P.L. 103 – 106) required 
states to adhere to minimum standards of registration and to establish registries of sex 
offenders against children. The Act was amended with Megan’s Law (P.L. 104 – 145) 
two years later (1996), requiring states to release the information on sex offenders to the 
public.  
One of the many potential economic consequences of these laws was a possible 
property value reduction in the vicinity of a registered offender. In an important and 
highly-cited early research, Linden and Rockoff (2008) studied property sales data in 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, from 1994 to 2004 and found that properties 
within 0.1-mile of an offender sold for approximately four percent lower than comparable 
homes further away upon the offender’s arrival. In another highly-cited paper, Pope 
(2008) used property sales data from 1996 to 2006 from Hillsborough County, Florida, 
and found average housing values in close proximity to an offender decreased by two 
percent after arrival but rebounded after the offender moved out.  
Overall, it is believed that the estimates of Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope 
(2008) provided compelling evidence that sex offenders moving into an area decrease the 
area’s property values and that these estimates primarily reflected households’ perception 
of crime risk. This study uses more recent data (2008 – 2018) from Maryland to provide 
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updated estimates for the impact of sex offenders on local housing prices. Importantly, 
during the past two decades, the laws on sex offender registration and notification 
methods have changed significantly. Notably, in earlier years (1994 – 2006), notification 
methods were more direct (proactive) and commonly included media releases, print-outs, 
mailings, door-to-door contact, and community meetings (Matson and Lieb 1996). 
However, after 2006 information directed to local residents became more passive, with 
the primary policy tool to inform residents changed to sex offender registry websites 
(Levenson, D'Amora, and Hern 2007, Levenson et al. 2007, Tewksbury and Jennings 
2010).  
The objective of this paper is to apply the hedonic pricing method (HPM), using 
more recent data from Maryland, to estimate the impact of crime risk from sex offenders 
on proximate property values. Specifically, we use housing values in four counties of 
Maryland, including Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Prince George County, and 
Montgomery County from 2008 to 2018. This data allows us to evaluate the impact of 
sex offenders moving into a neighborhood on property values when the passive 
notification method is used.  
Following the approach in Linden and Rockoff (2008), we obtained data on 
registered sex offenders in these four counties as of April 2019 and combined it with the 
housing dataset based on spatial locations and arrival dates relative to residential housing 
sales dates. Different from the previous evidence on registered sex offenders’ crime risk, 
our econometric results show no negative impacts on proximate home values from sex 
offenders’ arrivals. This is consistent across all four counties in Maryland and is also 
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robust to model specifications using different spatial fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered at different levels.  
The contributions of this paper are of three-fold. First, different from previous 
research using a single county or city as study areas, we use the latest data on registered 
sex offenders from four counties of Maryland. Second, this paper provides new evidence 
of the impact of crime risk from sex offenders’ arrivals on proximate property values. 
Results show no negative impact on the values of single-family properties within 0.1-
mile of registered sex offenders upon their arrivals. Third, the new evidence from this 
paper implies that sex offenders do not cause the financial cost to households living in the 
vicinity to them. This result has broader implications to the debate over sex offenders’ 
laws to be discussed in later sections.  
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 The Hedonic Pricing Method and Applications to Sex Offenders’ Crime Risk 
HPM is a revealed preference approach to evaluate (dis)-amenities capitalized 
into housing markets. HPM has been applied to evaluate the crime risk from sex 
offenders moving into neighborhoods on proximate property values. Using single-family 
housing data and registered sex offender dataset of 2000 from Montgomery County, 
Ohio, Larsen, Lowrey, and Coleman (2003) found the houses within 0.1-mile of an 
offender who was subject to proactive notification (e.g., notification of adjacent houses’ 
owners), sold for 17 percent less compared to houses located further away. Houses within 
0.1-mile of an offender who was subject to passive notification (e.g., viewable on 
sheriff’s office website), sold for 7.5 percent less compared to houses located further 
away.  
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Linden and Rockoff (2008) utilized a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy to 
address potential cross-sectional and temporal biases. To explain in detail, Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) use registered sex offender dataset as of January 2005 and single-family 
housing data of 1994 – 2004 in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina and find that home 
prices within 0.1-mile of an offender were sold for four percent less upon an offender’s 
arrival. Similarly, Pope (2008) collected single-family housing transactions between 
October 1996 and April 2006 and the archived information of all the sex offenders 
registered from November 1997 through April 2006 in Hillsborough County, Florida. 
Using the same identification strategy, he found that the average housing value within 
0.1-mile of an offender decreased by 2.3% after the offender’s arrival but rebounded after 
the offender moved out.  
More recently, Wentland, Waller, and Brastow (2014) examined the impact of sex 
offenders on housing liquidity in addition to the transaction price. Based on a Multiple 
Listing Service dataset and an archived sex offender dataset in central Virginia 
(Lynchburg and surrounding areas) between July 1999 and June 2009, they showed that 
the presence of sex offenders reduced the property values of homes located within 0.1 
miles by 7% and this negative effect dampened until 1-mile from an offender. Also, 
offenders’ presence lengthened a property’s time on the market by as much as 80%.  
To differentiate the risk between transient and non-transient sex offenders, Yeh 
(2015) applied HPM to high-risk sex offenders listed in Lincoln, Nebraska between 2000 
and 2006. She found that the announcement of a nearby high-risk offender, who 
remained in residence for more than six months, depressed house prices within 0.1 miles 
by four percentage points while the announcement of all offenders had no impact on 
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nearby house prices. Moreover, offenders tend to stay in better neighborhoods for 
transient periods while tend to maintain more permanent residence in worse 
neighborhoods. This pattern may suggest some correlation between the quality of 
neighborhoods and offenders’ negative externality on nearby housing values.  
Improving upon Larsen, Lowrey, and Coleman (2003), Caudill, Affuso, and Yang 
(2015) implemented a cross-sectional HPM analysis accounting for the spatial and 
temporal autocorrelation between properties. Using sex offender data from Memphis and 
property data from the Shelby County, they composed a sample of houses sold after sex 
offenders’ arrivals within 1-mile from 2008 to 2012. Using a spatial error model, they 
found a 10% increase in the distance from the nearest offender lifted house prices by 
approximately 0.17%, and an additional offender within a one-mile radius lowered 
property values by around 2%.  
The negative impact of sex offenders’ crime risk on property values has also been 
found outside of the US. Using the nationwide administrative data in South Korea, Kim 
and Lee (2018) found that house prices fell by 5.5% (3% for multifamily homes) within a 
150-meter and a 150-300-meter radius of the nearest sex offender in 1-month after the 
offender moved-in. However, this negative effect disappeared after 1-month of arrival. 
The effect was more significant and prolonged among homes located in areas wherein the 
population density was low.  
4.2.2 The Change in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Methods  
Over the last two decades, two laws have largely contributed to the change of sex 
offender registration and notification methods. First, in 2003 the Protect Act (P.L. 103) 
required states to maintain a website containing registry information and the Department 
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of Justice to maintain a website with links to each state website.42 Second, in 2006 the 
Adam Walsh Act (P.L. 109 – 248) created a national sex offender registry website and 
instructed states to apply identical criteria for posting offender data on the internet, 
including offenders’ name, physical description, and employment information among 
others.  
As of February 2001, only 29 states and the District of Columbia had publicly 
accessible internet sites containing searchable information of sex offenders (Adams 
2002). As of March 2018, all the states and the District of Columbia have sex offender 
registration website.43 However, the advent and dependence on passive notification 
methods may have reduced the public’s awareness of sex offenders in nearby 
neighborhoods. Based on two mailing survey samples in Hamilton County, Ohio, and 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, in 2002 – 2003, Beck and Travis Iii (2006) found that 77 
percent of eligible residents living adjacent to sex offenders subject to proactive 
notification were aware of the presence of the offenders. In contrast, only 26 percent of 
eligible residents living near offenders under passive notification were aware of the 
presence of the offenders. Also, based on a telephone survey sample in Washington State 
in 2002, people who were notified of a sex offender’s arrival in their community were 
more likely to fear personal victimization and to take precautionary behavior to protect 
themselves and others from victimization than those who were not notified (Beck and 
Travis Iii 2004).  
                                                          
42 https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm. 
43 This is based on the Department of Justice (DOJ) website https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-
offender-registration-and-notification-act-sorna (accessed on May 23, 2019). 
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4.2.3 Sex Offender Registration Laws in Maryland 
Maryland adopted a sex offender registration law and established its first version 
of the Sex Offender Registry on Oct 1, 1995. Anyone who committed crimes on or after 
Oct 1, 1995, against a victim younger than 14 years old is required to register with local 
law enforcement annually for ten years. The sex offense victims’ automated notification 
system, which allows victims to access offenders’ status any time, was required from 
then on (Maryland Sexual Offender Advisory Board 2014 Report to the Maryland 
General Assembly).  
Under the current law of Maryland, a sex offender must register with a 
supervising authority (e.g., the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services) 
within three days of release from the court or before the release from a correctional 
facility. The supervising authority is required to send the registration files to the Sex 
Offender Registry Unit within five days of registration. Moreover, if offenders move, 
they must submit written notification to the registry unit within seven days. Offenders 
failing to register an address or provide notice of the change of address may be subject to 
imprisonment for up to three years or a fine of up to $5,000 or both.  
The Maryland Sex Offender Registry is under the state’s Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Services. It maintains the Maryland’s Comprehensive Registered 
Sex Offender Website, which reveals each sex offender’s address information (e.g., 
current address, the move in date to the current address, employment address, school 
address), conviction information (e.g., date, location, charges), custody information (e.g., 
supervising agency), registration information (e.g., status, tier, date), demographic 
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information (e.g., gender, date of birth, age, height, weight, race). It also ensures that all 
information on sex offenders in Maryland is up to date and accurate. 
4.3 Data Source 
4.3.1 Sex Offender Dataset 
Sex offender data was collected from Maryland Registered Sex Offender Website. 
To our knowledge, Maryland is the only state reporting the move-in dates and the current 
addresses of registered sex offenders online. Other states report initial registration dates 
or most recent registration dates, which are updated every several months (e.g., three 
months for Tier III offenders in Maryland). Neither can be used as an approximation for 
the date upon which offenders move into their current location.  
Maryland has a high registration compliance rate among sex offenders. As of 
April 17, 2019, Maryland Registered Sex Offender Website reported a total of 6,056 
individuals required to register. Among them, there were 5,690 (94%) compliant 
offenders, 192 (3.17%) absconders, and 174 (2.87%) non-compliant offenders. 
Information was obtained for all registered sex offenders that were compliant and 
resided in the four counties with the most registered sex offenders in Maryland 
(Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Prince George County, and Montgomery County). 
The sex offender dataset includes 1,208 offenders in Baltimore City, 758 offenders in 
Baltimore County, 713 offenders in Prince George County, and 399 offenders in 
Montgomery County (Figure 1). After removing homeless sex offenders and those living 
in apartments, we geocoded 860 sex offenders in Baltimore City, 623 sex offenders in 
Baltimore County, 552 sex offenders in Prince George County, and 305 sex offenders in 
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Montgomery County using Google Open Street Map.44 After removing sex offenders 
whose addresses were geocoded imprecisely and those who have lived in their current 
addresses for less than a year, we kept 447 sex offenders in Baltimore City, 349 sex 
offenders in Baltimore County, 330 sex offenders in Prince George County, and 173 sex 
offenders in Montgomery County.45  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for sex offenders. The average age of 
sex offenders is 47 years old. The average height and weight of offenders are very similar 
across four counties. On average offenders have lived at their current address for three 
and a half years. The percentages of sex offenders being employed and driving vehicles 
are highest in Montgomery County and lowest in Baltimore City. Approximately a 
quarter of offenders are under community supervision. Regarding race, 55% of offenders 
are African Americans, and 42% of them are White. Maryland categorizes sex offenders 
into three levels based on their degree of riskiness. The majority of offenders are in Tier 
III, especially in Baltimore City.  
4.3.2 Housing Dataset 
Housing sale price data used in this study were obtained from the Maryland Open 
Data Portal. Specifically, data for single-family residential houses were collected for 
Baltimore County, Baltimore City, Montgomery County, Prince George County for the 
years 2008 to 2018. Each observation represented a real property transaction record, and 
prices were inflation adjusted to represent 2018 US dollars. The housing data contains 
detailed structural characteristics, including lot size, structure size, the year a property 
                                                          
44 Results with the sex offenders living in apartments are very similar to those without.  
45 The sex offenders’ addresses geocoded approximately (interpolated, geometric center, approximate) were 
removed.  
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was built, dwelling grade (above average, average, and below average), exterior 
construction material (e.g., Brick, Frame, Siding, etc.), the number of stories, and 
whether or not a basement exists.  
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the parcel characteristics for each of the 
four counties. On average, Baltimore City has the smallest land size, and structure area, 
and had the highest percentage of lowest quality properties. Also, Baltimore City contains 
the oldest and least expensive properties among the four counties. The average age of the 
parcels in Baltimore City is 77-year-old. The average house price is highest in 
Montgomery County ($755,000), which is almost twice as high the average house price 
in Baltimore County ($398,000) and Prince George County ($386,000) and is more than 
twice as much as that in Baltimore City ($301,000).  
More than eighty percent of parcels in these counties have basements, and less 
than half of them have one or one and a half stories. The most popular dwelling exterior 
material is siding in Baltimore City or Baltimore County, while is a frame in the rest two 
counties. The parcel quality is highest in Montgomery County, where more than 56% of 
all parcels’ quality is above average. Baltimore County has the second-best quality 
properties, with 50% of them has average quality, and 24% of them has above average 
quality. Prince George County has 57% low-quality properties but 9% high-quality 
properties only. Similarly, Baltimore City has 62% of low-quality properties but 23% 
high-quality properties.  
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample, combining all 
four counties. The three columns show the summary of (1) all parcels, (2) parcels in the 
control area (between 0.1 and 0.3 miles to an offender), and (3) parcels in the treated area 
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(within 0.1 miles of an offender). The table shows that parcels inside 0.1 miles of an 
offender are quite similar to parcels within the 0.3 miles cut-off but are very different 
from those outside 0.3 miles range. Specifically, on average parcels within 0.1 miles of 
an offender sold for approximately $6,000 less, were 0.02 acres smaller and two years 
younger than parcels between 0.1 and 0.3 miles to an offender. In contrast, the parcels 
within 0.1 miles of an offender sold for approximately $150,000 less, were 0.23 acres 
smaller and ten years older, compared to all parcels. Also, the houses within the 0.3-mile 
range have fewer stories, approximately 33% of them have one story, 23% has 1.5 
stories, and 44% has 2 or more stories, compared to all parcels.  
4.4 Empirical Approach  
4.4.1 Cross-sectional Difference Specification 
Before testing the impact of sex offenders arriving in a local area, we check the 
pre-arrival difference between the area offenders will arrive (within 0.1-mile of an 
offender) and that adjacent to it (between 0.1- and 0.3-mile from the offender). If these 
two areas are similar in parcel characteristics, the adjacent area can be served as the 
counterfactual for the within 0.1-mile area when offenders arrive.  
The cross-sectional difference specification takes the following form:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜌0𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (1) 
The semi-log of the inflation-adjusted sale price of the house is a function of a binary 
variable, 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.1, indicating a parcel sale is inside the treated area (within 0.1 miles of an 
offender’s residence), 𝛿𝑡, a vector of year specific fixed effects, and a random error term 
clustered by offender area. We also replace the sale price with other parcel characteristics 
as dependent variables to examine the difference in others.  
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4.4.2 Spatial Difference-in-differences Identification Strategy 
To estimate the impact of the sex offenders on property values, we use a spatial 
difference-in-difference (DD) method. The benefit of spatial DD models, compared with 
cross-sectional models, is that spatial DD models can potentially mitigate endogeneity 
caused by sex offenders moving into neighborhoods with systematically different 
property values (Pope 2008).  
In addition to the cross-sectional difference specification, the spatial DD 
specification adds an indicator variable for houses sold within 0.3-mile of an offender’s 
location (𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.3) and an interaction of this indicator with another indicator, which equals 
one if the sale took place after the offender’s arrival (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡). Also included in the 
spatial DD model are Census block group-by-year fixed effects (𝛿𝑗𝑡) and observable 
parcel level characteristics (𝑋𝑖). Formally, to evaluate the impact of the sex offenders’ 
arrival on nearby property values, we use the following empirical specification  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = (𝜌0𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.1 + 𝜑0𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.3) + (𝜌1𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.1 + 𝜑1𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.3) ×
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
(2) 
Using this specification, parameters 𝜌0 and 𝜑0 will capture the pre-existing locational 
difference in property values and 𝜌1 and 𝜑1 will capture the effect of a sex offender’s 
arrival on property values in the treated area and control area.  
We first estimate the Equation (2) using the pooled sample. This model assumes 
that the relationships between housing prices and characteristics are similar within and 
outside offender areas, the areas within the 0.3-mile of offenders. To relax this 
assumption, Equation (2) is re-estimated using the sales two years before and after 
offenders’ arrivals in offender areas. For these estimations, we use offender area-by-year 
 89 
 
fixed effects instead of Census block group-by-year fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors at the offender area level instead of the Census block group level. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Graphical Evidence 
Figure 4.2 plots pooled sample housing price gradients for the distance from sex 
offenders’ locations for the year before the sex offender moved in and the year after the 
arrival of an offender. Visually inspecting this figure, there is little observed impact of the 
arrival of a sex offender on housing prices. In Figure 4.2, housing price gradients stay 
almost the same within the 0.1-mile of offenders during the year before and after an 
offender’s arrival. The housing price gradients more than 0.1-mile from offenders change 
substantially, which is likely due to general temporal change in the housing market.  
The housing price gradients in each county are different (Figure 4.3). In Baltimore 
City, the gradients within 0.1-mile of offenders’ locations decreased by approximately 
$50,000 after an offenders’ arrival, while other property values did not change much. In 
contrast, in Montgomery County, the gradients within 0.1-mile of offenders increase by 
approximately $50,000 post offenders’ arrivals. Besides, the gradients in Baltimore 
County and Prince George County stay almost the same within 0.3-mile of offenders.  
In addition to the price gradient, Figure 4.4 and 4.5 plot the price trends over the 
two years pre- and post-offender arrival in both treated and control areas. Figure 4.4 
shows that housing values in the treated area are lower than those in the control area in 
the year before offenders’ arrivals, and both follow the same downward trend. Following 
the offenders’ arrivals, the values in treated area jump by a larger magnitude than those in 
control area initially, then quickly decrease to levels below those in control area and 
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flatten out after one-year post arrivals. Combined with the separate graphs of the four 
counties (Figure 4.5), these figures of prices trends show almost no effect on housing 
values in the treated area following sex offenders’ arrivals.  
4.5.2 Empirical Results  
4.5.2.1 Pre-existing Differences in Housing Characteristics between Treated and 
Control Areas 
Recall that our estimation strategy relies on the relative similarity of houses sold 
within 0.1-mile of an offender to those sold between 0.1- and 0.3-mile of an offender. To 
test any pre-existing differences in parcel characteristics between these two areas, a 
cross-sectional specification, Equation (1), is estimated. In this estimation, we limit the 
sample to the sales that took place in the two years before the offenders’ arrival and test 
log of price, land size, structure area size, property age, an indicator of dwelling blow 
average, and an indicator of having a basement. Results are presented in Table 4.4. 
Overall, we find little evidence of any pre-existing differences, except that the land size 
inside 0.1-mile is 0.03 acres smaller than that between 0.1- and 0.3-mile from offenders. 
4.5.2.2 The Impact of Sex Offenders’ Arrivals 
Next, we present the impact of sex offenders’ arrival using the pooled sample of 
all four counties in Maryland (Table 4.5). Column 1 presents the estimates from Equation 
(1). The estimate of 𝜌0 from this specification shows that the average price of the houses 
within 0.1-mile of an offender’s future location is approximately 35 percent lower than 
that of other houses sold in the same year. However, this difference disappears once we 
include Census block group-by-year fixed effects and housing characteristics in the 
regression (column 2 of Table 4.3). This demonstrates that the control variables capture 
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almost all the differences between areas in which offenders move in and the rest of the 
counties.   
The estimates from a simple pre-post comparison without the indicator variables 
for parcels selling between 0.1 and 0.3 miles from the offenders) show sex offenders’ 
arrivals had no impact on the prices of the homes located in the treated area (column 3 of 
Table 4.5). Based on the estimates from Equation (2), spatial DD, we still find an 
insignificant estimate of the impact of sex offender’s arrival (column 4). We are 95 
percent confident that the impact estimate is between – 2.5 percent and 1.2 percent. The 
estimated change in value for houses located between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an offender’s 
location when the offender arrives is positive (1.2 percent) and significant at the 10 
percent level. This suggests that homeowners living just slightly farther away from the 
offender (between 0.1- and 0.3-mile) experienced an increase in property values on 
average.  
Next, we re-estimate Equation (2) using the sample of sales two years before and 
after offenders’ arrivals from offender areas (column 5 of Table 4.5). The estimates from 
this column show that the impact of sex offenders’ arrivals on housing values within 0.1-
mile of an offender is insignificant. However, the estimated change in value for houses 
located between 0.1- and 0.3-mile of an offender’s location when the offender arrives is 
positive (3.0 percent).  
Note Figure 4.4 and 4.5 show no change in property values within the 0.1-mile of 
an offender after the offender’s arrival, regardless of the distance to the offender. To 
check this, we add an interaction using a binary variable indicating a sale within 0.1-mile 
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of an offender after the offender has moved in, and the distance from the offender.46 The 
results are consistent with the figures. Parcels a tenth of a mile away experienced no 
change in value as those directly adjacent to the offenders’ locations (column 6 of Table 
4.5). 
 Table 4.6 presents the results from our primary model spatial DD for each of the 
four counties in Maryland. In Baltimore City, homes located in the treated area sold for 
0.98 percent more, on average, than surrounding homes before an offender’s arrival, and 
2.19 percent more after the offender’s arrival (column 1 of Table 4.6). This 1.21 percent 
increase is insignificant. The 95 percent confidence interval of this estimate is between – 
4.1 percent and 8.4 percent. In Baltimore County, homes located in the treated area sold 
for 0.13 percent less, on average, than surrounding homes before an offender’s arrival, 
and 1.41 percent less after the arrival (column 2 of Table 4.6). This difference, 1.28 
percent, is still insignificant. The 95 percent confidence interval of this estimate is 
between -4.3 percent and 1.4 percent.  
In Prince George County, homes located within 0.1-mile of an offender were 3.46 
percent more expensive, on average, than surrounding homes before the offender’s 
arrival, but 1.44 percent less after the arrival (column 3 of Table 4.6). This 4.9 percent 
drop is still insignificant. Its 95 percent confidence interval is between -5.2 percent and 
2.3 percent. Finally, in Montgomery County, homes located in the treated area were 0.9 
percent less expensive than surrounding homes prior to the offender’s arrival, but just 
0.06 percent less after the arrival (column 4 of Table 4.6). Again, this 0.84 percent 
                                                          
46  We rescale the distance so that a value of 1 represents 0.1-mile from an offender for the ease of 
interpretation.  
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increase is insignificant. Its 95 percent confidence interval is between – 2.7 percent and 
2.6 percent.  
In summary, the results suggest a missing negative externality from sex offenders’ 
crime risk on proximate property values, which is distinctly different from the findings of 
the previous literature (Linden and Rockoff 2008, Pope 2008). We find no evidence of 
pre-existing differences in housing price trends between houses in the offender areas and 
those in the surrounding areas.  
4.5.2.3 Robustness Checks 
Table 4.7 presents the results of a falsification test using false arrival dates equal 
to two years and three years prior to offenders’ actual arrival dates. Results suggest home 
values within 0.1 miles of a future sex offender were not changed relative to those 
between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of the offender in the two years or three years prior to the 
offender’s arrival.  
Table 4.8 presents the results of models estimated with alternate fixed-effect 
specifications. In column 1, Census block group-by-year fixed effects were used, in 
column 2 Census block-by-year fixed effects were used, and in column 3 Census tract-
by-year fixed effects were used. Together, these robustness checks confirm insignificant 
negative effects of crime risk from sex offenders’ arrivals.  
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the impact of the perceived crime risk from registered sex 
offenders’ arrivals, notified through sex offender registry websites, on proximate property 
values. The analysis makes use of a unique data set from 2008 – 2018 for four counties in 
Maryland, including Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Prince George County, and 
 94 
 
Montgomery County. The econometric results provide no evidence that the arrival of a 
sex offender in a neighborhood causes a reduction in property values. These results differ 
considerably from the prior literature that found that sex offenders reduced property 
values. 
Both Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) found a significant reduction in 
property values upon sex offenders’ arrivals in the neighborhood. However, their results 
were based on the housing data around 1995 – 2005 when proactive community 
notification methods were often used. Proactive notifications are more likely to increase 
households fears over potential abductions or attacks (Beck and Travis Iii 2004). Our 
study is based on housing data after 2008 when passive notification methods were used. 
Our results suggest that passive notification methods (e.g., listing sex offenders on 
websites) have a smaller impact on property values. This is potentially due in part to 
awareness (Beck and Travis Iii 2006) and fear over personal victimization (Beck and 
Travis Iii 2004).  
Sex offender’s registration and notification laws have generated a contentious 
debate since their conception. First, there is doubt over the laws’ validity since sex 
offenders’ recidivism rates are relatively low among criminals. For instance, the U.S. 
Department of Justice found 5.3% of sex offender were rearrested for another sex crime 
among almost 9,700 offenders within three years of their 1994 state prison release 
(Langan, Smith, and Durose 2003). Also, a meta-analysis of approximately one hundred 
studies showed that the reported sexual recidivism rate was approximately 14% over a 4 
– 6 follow-up years among nearly 30,000 sex offenders in North America and United 
Kingdom (Hanson, Morton-Bourgon, and Safety 2004, Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 
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2005). While this could still be considered high, it is much lower than other forms of 
recidivism.  
Second, literature has found mixed evidence on the laws’ effectiveness in 
reducing sex crimes. The purpose of the laws is to provide better information to local law 
enforcement agencies to apprehend offenders and to empower the public with better 
knowledge of offenders to self-protect themselves and prevent sex offenses from 
happening (Bedarf 1995). Earlier studies found little evidence that registration and 
notification laws had a meaningful effect on sex offenders’ recidivism rates or overall sex 
offense rates (Schram and Milloy 1995, Adkins et al. 2000, Vásquez, Maddan, and 
Walker 2008, Agan 2011). However, Prescott and Rockoff (2011) found that sex 
offender registration was associated with a significant decrease in the frequency of 
reported sex offenses. They also found that the notification law was associated with a 
reduction in the frequency of sex offenses committed by first-time offenders. 
Third, critics also argue that the sex offender laws removed the anonymity of sex 
offenders, which stigmatizes their families and creates a significant barrier for their re-
integration into the community and to find housing as well as employment opportunities, 
which might increase recidivism (Zevitz and Farkas 2000, Tewksbury 2005, Levenson 
and Cotter 2005).  
This paper suggests that sex offenders’ arrivals might not bring financial cost to 
nearby households. At least two reasons might explain this phenomenon. One, the 
frequency of registered sex offenders re-committing sex crimes might be low in 
Maryland during the past decade, which would be consistent with the finding in the 
literature that sex offenders have a low recidivism rate. The other, the passive notification 
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method might be effective in dissuading crimes committed by sex offenders, particularly 
first-time offenders, because of the penalty of distributing sex offenders’ information 
through the internet. 
An important caveat to our conclusions is that we study the sex offenders who 
live in their current addresses as of April 2019. Studies based on registry data at one point 
in time might suffer from bias since move-in dates exist for the current address only. 
Also, old move-in dates capture offenders who lived in the current addresses for long, 
which might not be representative to all the offenders moved in during the similar dates 
but moved out later. Based on the records in Lincoln, Nebraska, most sex offenders tend 
to live in an address for less than six months, and the neighborhoods offender live 
temporarily were on average better than those where they maintain more permanent 
residences (Yeh 2015).  
Overall, this analysis provides an additional piece of evidence for the debate over 
the sex offender registration and notification policies. The results of this paper reveal no 
reduction in property values proximate to sex offenders’ residences following their 
arrivals in the four counties in Maryland (2018-2019). This evidence implies that 
households may not face financial loss due to sex offenders’ arrivals in the same 
neighborhoods. However, future research in this area is needed to evaluate the impact of 
more recent sex offenders’ laws on the communities. 
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Figure 4.1: Sex Offenders and Houses in Four Maryland Counties 
 
Notes: Sex offender dataset was collected from Maryland Registered Sex Offender Website 
as of April 2019.  
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Figure 4.2: Price Gradient of Distance from Offenders in the Four Counties of Maryland 
 
Notes: Results from local polynomial regression of housing price on distance from sex 
offenders, with epanechnikov function and degree 0. Single-family residential sales data 
was obtained from the Maryland Open Data Portal, 2008 – 2018.  
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Figure 4.3: Price Gradient of Distance from Offenders in Maryland Separated by 
Counties 
 
Notes: Results from local polynomial regression of housing price on distance from sex 
offenders, with epanechnikov function and degree 0. Single-family residential sales data 
was obtained from the Maryland Open Data Portal, 2008 – 2018.  
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Figure 4.4: Price Trends before and after Offenders’ Arrivals in Maryland 
 
Notes: Results from local polynomial regression of housing price on distance from sex 
offenders, with epanechnikov function and degree 0. Single-family residential sales data 
was obtained from the Maryland Open Data Portal, 2008 – 2018.  
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Figure 4.5: Price Trends before and after Offenders’ Arrivals in Maryland Separated by 
Counties 
 
Notes: Results from local polynomial regression of housing price on distance from sex 
offenders, with epanechnikov function and degree 0. Single-family residential sales data 
was obtained from the Maryland Open Data Portal, 2008 – 2018.  
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Table 4.1: Registered Sex Offender Characteristics in Four Maryland Counties as of 
April 2018 
  
Four 
Counties 
Baltimore 
City 
Baltimore 
County 
Prince 
George 
County 
Montgomery 
County 
Age  47.109 47.018 46.688 46.945 48.503 
(years) (13.22) (12.68) (13.69) (12.78) (14.43) 
Height 69.794 69.819 69.954 69.903 69.202 
(inches) (3.23) (3.22) (3.15) (3.32) (3.21) 
Weight 194.396 189.438 199.352 195.597 194.913 
(lbs.) (41.28) (39.12) (43.04) (40.55) (43.35) 
Length of living 1281.493 1124.132 1331.510 1345.303 1465.468 
(days) (868.12) (824.02) (856.32) (844.47) (983.68)       
Employed 53.4% 41.4% 53.3% 60.3% 71.7% 
Vehicle 46.3% 18.6% 66.2% 47.3% 75.7% 
Under Community 
Supervision 24.6% 20.6% 31.2% 22.7% 24.9%       
Race      
White 42.0% 22.1% 74.8% 22.1% 64.7% 
African American 54.5% 76.5% 21.5% 75.2% 24.9% 
Other 3.5% 1.3% 3.7% 2.7% 10.4%       
Skin Color      
Dark 11.1% 16.1% 3.4% 15.5% 5.2% 
Medium 52.8% 62.4% 30.4% 58.5% 62.4% 
Light 32.3% 19.0% 62.5% 22.1% 24.9% 
Other 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 1.8% 1.2%       
Eye Color      
Dark 82.9% 91.3% 65.9% 90.6% 80.9% 
Light 17.1% 8.7% 34.1% 9.4% 19.1%       
Hair Color      
Dark 82.4% 82.6% 76.8% 89.4% 79.8% 
Light 12.5% 10.7% 18.1% 6.1% 17.9% 
Other 5.2% 6.7% 5.2% 4.5% 2.3%       
Risky tier      
I 14.5% 8.3% 14.6% 16.7% 26.0% 
II 15.4% 8.5% 32.4% 6.7% 15.6% 
III 70.1% 83.2% 53.0% 76.7% 58.4% 
Number of Offenders 1,299 447 349 330 173 
Notes: Sex offender dataset was collected from Maryland Registered Sex Offender 
Website as of April 2019. Mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported.   
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Table 4.2: Parcel Characteristics in Each of the Four Maryland County, 2008 - 2018 
  
Baltimore 
City 
  
Baltimore 
County 
  
Prince 
George 
County   
Montgomery 
County 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 304.135  381.894  356.368  742.927 
(2018 $1,000) (198.50)  (220.14)  (161.78)  (406.17) 
Land size 0.215  0.649  0.416  0.462 
(acres) (0.15)  (1.65)  (1.55)  (1.04) 
Structure area 1.840  2.028  2.188  2.413 
(1,000 square feet) (0.83)  (1.00)  (1.12)  (1.17) 
age 81.263  46.372  36.568  41.615 
(years) (22.84)  (29.98)  (29.40)  (26.18)         
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 97.6%  89.3%  80.6%  93.2%         
Story height        
1 story 10.4%  28.4%  31.3%  24.0% 
1.5 stories 28.4%  22.6%  13.4%  10.0% 
2 or more stories or split 61.2%  49.0%  55.3%  66.0%         
Dwelling exterior 
material        
Frame 13.9%  10.8%  79.1%  39.9% 
Brick 19.3%  18.9%  19.7%  28.7% 
Siding 33.6%  56.6%  -  21.8% 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame -  1.7%  -  6.8% 
Asbestos shingle 11.7%  5.0%  -  - 
Stucco 6.6%  2.7%  -  - 
Other 14.9%  4.4%  1.3%  2.8%         
Quality tier        
Average 16.4%  50.9%  32.0%  41.4% 
Above average 24.6%  23.6%  11.8%  56.9% 
Below average 59.0%  25.3%  56.1%  1.4% 
        
Sample size 7,104   35,521   37,088   49,227 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from the Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018. 
  
 104 
 
Table 4.3: Parcel Characteristics in Combined Four Maryland Counties, 2008 - 2018 
  All parcels 
  
Parcels between 
0.1 and 0.3 mile 
of an offender   
Parcels within 
0.1 mile of an 
offender 
 Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 508.104  351.328  344.999 
(2018 $1,000) (346.97)  (206.80)  (193.39) 
Land size 0.487  0.246  0.225 
(acres) (1.37)  (0.33)  (0.30) 
Structure area 2.211  1.717  1.688 
(1,000 square feet) (1.11)  (0.81)  (0.75) 
age 43.658  54.301  52.402 
(years) (29.71)  (28.19)  (28.18) 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 88.7%  86.2%  84.2%       
Story height      
1 story 26.6%  32.8%  32.2% 
1.5 stories 15.4%  23.4%  23.8% 
2 or more stories or 
split 58.0%  43.9%  43.9%       
Dwelling exterior 
material      
Frame 41.7%  37.6%  38.6% 
Brick 22.9%  24.0%  23.7% 
Siding 25.8%  28.0%  28.4% 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame 3.1%  1.5%  1.4% 
Asbestos shingle 2.0%  3.7%  3.4% 
Stucco 1.1%  1.6%  1.3% 
Other 3.5%  3.7%  3.3%       
Quality tier      
Average 39.9%  40.8%  35.7% 
Above average 33.0%  14.0%  15.2% 
Below average 26.9%  45.0%  49.1% 
Sample size 128,940   38,848   6,067 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from the Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018. 
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Table 4.4: Pre-arrival Differences in Average Characteristics of Homes Sold within 0.3 Mile of Offenders' Locations 
Pre-arrival differences in sales Log price 
Land size in 
acres 
Structure 
Area in 
1,000 
Square feet 
Age in 
years 
Below 
average 
dwelling 
Basement 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.0116 -0.0304*** 0.0104 -4.612 0.0102 -0.0133 
 (0.0274) (0.0108) (0.0771) (2.817) (0.0321) (0.0172) 
Constant 12.63*** 0.253*** 1.748*** 53.63*** 0.449*** 0.860*** 
 (0.0226) (0.00712) (0.0390) (1.349) (0.0228) (0.0102) 
Sample Size 8,105 8,105 8,105 8,105 8,105 8,105 
R-squared 0.015 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.005 0.002 
Notes: Pre-arrival refers to the two-year period before the date upon which the offender moved to a current address. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by offender areas. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value using Combined Four Maryland Counties 
  
Log (sale price) pre-arrival   Log (sale price), pre- and post-arrival 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.348*** 0.00145  0.00172 0.00911 -0.0142 -0.0143 
 (0.0267) (0.00578)  (0.00839) (0.00804) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival    -0.000602 -0.00634 0.00917 0.0175 
    (0.00937) (0.00936) (0.0163) (0.0184) 
Dist<=0.1mile * post-arrival       0.00590 
(0.1 Mile = 1)       (0.00583) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender     -0.0220***   
     (0.00702)   
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival     0.0123* 0.0299** 0.0174 
     (0.00684) (0.0126) (0.0180) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival 
= 0    
p-value = 
0.949 
p-value = 
0.498 
p-value = 
0.575 
p-value = 
0.342 
Housing Characteristics  √  √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √       
Census block group-year fixed 
effects  √  √ √   
Offender area-year fixed effects      √ √ 
Restricted to Offender Areas and 
2 years pre- and post-arrival      √ √ 
Standard errors clustered by... 
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group  
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group 
Offender 
Area 
Offender 
Area 
Sample size 128,923 128,923  128,923 128,923 17,376 17,376 
R-squared 0.022 0.846  0.846 0.846 0.816 0.816 
Notes: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which offenders moved into their current 
address. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value in Each Four Maryland 
County 
  
Baltimore 
City 
Baltimore 
County 
Prince 
George 
County 
Montgomery 
County 
Within 0.1 mile of 
offender 0.00980 -0.00132 0.0346** -0.00922 
 (0.0214) (0.0123) (0.0173) (0.0122) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-
arrival 0.0219 -0.0141 -0.0144 -0.000558 
 (0.0319) (0.0145) (0.0190) (0.0137) 
Within 0.3 mile of 
offender -0.0228 -0.0177* -0.0274 -0.0195*** 
 (0.0248) (0.00906) (0.0184) (0.00548) 
Within 0.3 mile * post-
arrival -0.00106 0.0132 0.0239 0.00397 
 (0.0171) (0.0121) (0.0161) (0.00599) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * 
post-arrival = 0 
p-value = 
0.492 
p-value = 
0.331 
p-value = 
0.449 
p-value = 
0.967 
Housing Characteristics √ √ √ √ 
Census block group-year 
fixed effects 
√ √ √ √ 
Sample size 7,104 35,507 37,085 49,227 
R-squared 0.836 0.793 0.578 0.883 
Notes: This is based on Column 4 of Table 5. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered by census block group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: Falsification Test on Impact of Sex Offender Location using Combine Four 
Maryland Counties 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Baseline 
estimates 
Two-year 
prior arrival 
dates 
Three-year 
prior arrival 
dates 
        
Within 0.1 mile of offender 0.00911 0.0150 0.0133 
 (0.00804) (0.0105) (0.0122) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival -0.00634 -0.0138 -0.00992 
 (0.00936) (0.0112) (0.0125) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender -0.0220*** -0.0237*** -0.0260*** 
 (0.00702) (0.00865) (0.00978) 
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival 0.0123* 0.0113 0.0132 
 (0.00684) (0.00787) (0.00874) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival = 
0 
p-value = 
0.498 
p-value = 
0.219 
p-value = 
0.426 
Sample size 128,923 128,923 128,923 
R-squared 0.846 0.846 0.846 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the house price. All regressions contain 
census block group-year fixed effects and housing characteristics (see text for a list of 
characteristics included). Baseline results are taken from Column 4 of Table 3. Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by census block group. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival using Alternative Fixed Effects and 
Combined Four Maryland Counties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Within 0.1 mile of 
offender 0.00911 0.00935 0.00544 
 (0.00804) (0.0154) (0.00717) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-
arrival -0.00634 -0.0138 -0.00394 
 (0.00936) (0.0214) (0.00859) 
Within 0.3 mile of 
offender -0.0220*** -0.0138 -0.0250*** 
 (0.00702) (0.0131) (0.00567) 
Within 0.3 mile * post-
arrival 0.0123* 0.0126 0.0132** 
 (0.00684) (0.0164) (0.00624) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * 
post-arrival = 0 
p-value = 
0.498 
p-value = 
0.519 
p-value = 
0.647 
Housing Characteristics √ √ √ 
Census block group-year 
fixed effects 
√   
Census block-year fixed 
effects 
 √  
Census tract-year fixed 
effects 
  √ 
Standard errors clustered 
by... 
Census 
Block 
Group 
Census 
Block  
Census 
Tract 
Sample size 128,923 128,923 128,923 
R-squared 0.846 0.907 0.830 
Notes: Results are based on the model in Column 4 of Table 5. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5: The Conclusion to The Health Insurance and Sex Offender Policies and 
Laws 
This dissertation is motivated by two contentious debate over health policies and 
laws regarding health insurance and sex offenders. There have been numerous studies on 
the ACA since the implementation in 2010. Despite that, two research questions remain 
to be answered. Does Medicaid benefit of access to care encourage Medicaid enrollment 
among non-elderly adults? Does Medicaid improve access to care and birth outcomes? 
Chapter 2 and 3 address these two questions. On the other hand, the struggling to find 
evidence supporting the premises of sex offender registration and notification laws has 
raised the importance to re-evaluate the crime risk caused by sex offenders. Chapter 4 
evaluates the risk through housing price valuation following sex offenders’ arrivals on the 
proximate housing market. I summarize the main findings, limitations, and policy 
implications of each essay in turn.  
In Chapter 2, “Physician Payment and Demand for Health Insurance: Evidence 
from Medicaid Primary Care Payment Parity,” I examine the impact of Medicaid benefit 
of access to care, proxied by Medicaid-to-Medicare primary care physician payment 
ratio, on Medicaid coverage among non-elderly adults. This study exploits the quasi-
experiment of Medicaid primary care payment parity, which mandated Medicaid primary 
care physician payment under both FFS and MC to be increased to the level of Medicare 
in 2013 – 14. Using a generalized DD method, reimbursement rate, and ACS data of 
2010 – 2014, I find the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios of patient office visits are 
strongly positively correlated with Medicaid coverage among low-income non-elderly 
adults. Specifically, a 10-percentage-point increase in the fee ratio of a 30 (45)-minute 
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new patient office visit is associated with a 0.40 (0.36)-percentage-point increase in adult 
Medicaid coverage rate, and is associated with a 0.40 (0.39) percentage-point decrease in 
the uninsured rate, but is not associated with any change in the privately insured rate. 
These estimates suggest that more than 150,000 uninsured adults in poverty would enroll 
in Medicaid once this amount of payment change occurs. Further, subsample analyses 
suggest the impact is most significant among the near-elderly, non-parents, African-
Americans, as well as those living inside central cities of metropolitan areas. According 
to the most recent estimate from CMS monthly reports, Medicaid enrollment has grown 
by 13.6 million (35.9%) between July 2013 and July 2018 in expansion states, and by 1.9 
million (10.2%) between July 2013 and November 2017 in non-expansion states. This 
growth might have created more demand for health care from Medicaid patients, thus 
increasing the pressure on among primary care providers. However, the Medicaid 
physician payment is still low, on average at the level of 72% of Medicare payment as of 
2016 (Zuckerman, Skopec, and Epstein 2017). Based on the findings of this chapter, 
raising primary care physician payment is an important policy tool to reduce the barrier 
of access to care among Medicaid beneficiaries, especially for those enrolled in FFS 
based programs.  
In Chapter 3, “Public Insurance and Birth Outcomes: Evidence from Medicaid 
Implementation,” we re-evaluate the impact of Medicaid on access to care and birth 
outcomes based on the population eligible for Medicaid during its provision period. We 
minimize the concern over crowd-out from private insurance to Medicaid and simulate 
the individual-level variation of Medicaid treatment intensity among childbearing age 
women. Using both DD and matching methods, this chapter finds that Medicaid 
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provision shifted labor delivery from with a midwife or a physician to in a hospital and 
increased birth weight. These impacts were concentrated among nonwhite and unmarried 
mothers and those aged 30-49. This chapter also contributes to the current debate over 
Medicaid expansion by providing additional evidence of Medicaid’s impact on improving 
access to care and birth outcomes.   
In Chapter 4, “Does the Arrival of a Registered Sex Offender Hurt Property 
Values? Evidence from Maryland 2008 – 2018,” we estimate the crime risk from sex 
offenders on proximate property values based on most recent laws on sex offender 
registration and notification. Using the data on single-family residential property of 2008 
– 2018 and corresponding registered sex offender in four counties (Baltimore City, 
Baltimore County, Prince George County, and Montgomery County) as of April 2019 in 
Maryland, we apply a spatial DD strategy and find no negative impact of sex offenders’ 
arrivals on proximate home values within 0.1-mile of their residences. This result is 
robust to several robustness checks. Note an important drawback of our study is the sex 
offender dataset, which records the sex offenders living in their current residence at a 
particular point of time. This dataset may lose many sex offenders’ residences where they 
lived for some time before they moved out. This could create bias potentially due to the 
difference between sex offenders who move a lot and those who tend to stay in the same 
residence for a long period. Alternatively, the bias could come from the differential 
impacts of crime risk between temporal residences and permanent residences, where 
neighborhoods tend to be worse on average than the former (Yeh 2015). One extension of 
this chapter could use an archived sex offender dataset, which tracks their residences 
through time.  
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Overall, these chapters provide evidence to the debate over health policies and 
laws in the US. More work is needed to understand these issues further.   
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Appendices A: Appendices to Chapter 4 
Table A.1: Parcel Characteristics in Baltimore City, 2008 - 2018 
  All parcels 
  
Parcels between 
0.1 and 0.3 mile 
of an offender   
Parcels within 
0.1 mile of an 
offender 
 Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 304.135  250.976  244.593 
(2018 $1,000) (198.50)  (156.81)  (153.47) 
Land size 0.215  0.191  0.192 
(acres) (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
Structure area 1.840  1.688  1.675 
(1,000 square feet) (0.83)  (0.70)  (0.74) 
age 81.263  83.085  82.017 
(years) (22.84)  (18.77)  (19.74) 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 97.6%  98.2%  97.9%       
Story height      
1 story 10.4%  9.5%  9.5% 
1.5 stories 28.4%  33.3%  32.7% 
2 or more stories or 
split 61.2%  57.3%  57.8%       
Dwelling exterior 
material      
Frame 13.9%  14.2%  15.5% 
Brick 19.3%  18.4%  14.5% 
Siding 33.6%  35.7%  39.2% 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame -  -  - 
Asbestos shingle 11.7%  13.4%  14.3% 
Stucco 6.6%  6.2%  4.1% 
Other 14.9%  12.2%  12.4%       
Quality tier      
Average 16.4%  14.2%  13.3% 
Above average 24.6%  12.6%  9.1% 
Below average 59.0%  73.2%  77.6% 
Sample size 7,104   4,476   581 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from the Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018.  
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Table A.2: Parcel Characteristics in Baltimore County, 2008 - 2018 
  All parcels 
  
Parcels between 
0.1 and 0.3 mile 
of an offender   
Parcels within 
0.1 mile of an 
offender 
 Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 381.894  281.140  264.448 
(2018 $1,000) (220.14)  (134.82)  (114.62) 
Land size 0.649  0.258  0.239 
(acres) (1.65)  (0.34)  (0.29) 
Structure area 2.028  1.606  1.559 
(1,000 square feet) (1.00)  (0.65)  (0.57) 
age 46.372  53.108  52.427 
(years) (29.98)  (27.50)  (25.98) 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 89.3%  86.8%  83.3%       
Story height      
1 story 28.4%  31.1%  32.5% 
1.5 stories 22.6%  30.9%  33.3% 
2 or more stories or 
split 49.0%  38.0%  34.2%       
Dwelling exterior 
material      
Frame 10.8%  7.4%  7.3% 
Brick 18.9%  17.3%  17.0% 
Siding 56.6%  60.6%  61.7% 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame 1.7%  1.0%  1.1% 
Asbestos shingle 5.0%  6.8%  6.6% 
Stucco 2.7%  2.8%  2.8% 
Other 4.4%  4.1%  3.4%       
Quality tier      
Average 50.9%  49.4%  43.0% 
Above average 23.6%  9.0%  6.8% 
Below average 25.3%  41.5%  50.1% 
Sample size 35,521   12,112   1,828 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from the Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018. 
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Table A.3: Parcel Characteristics in Prince George County, 2008 - 2018 
  All parcels 
  
Parcels between 
0.1 and 0.3 mile 
of an offender   
Parcels within 
0.1 mile of an 
offender 
 Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 356.368  303.800  305.233 
(2018 $1,000) (161.78)  (134.41)  (126.76) 
Land size 0.416  0.259  0.232 
(acres) (1.55)  (0.31)  (0.35) 
Structure area 2.188  1.756  1.716 
(1,000 square feet) (1.12)  (0.93)  (0.83) 
age 36.568  48.410  47.998 
(years) (29.40)  (28.55)  (28.76) 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 80.6%  79.1%  78.2%       
Story height      
1 story 31.3%  40.3%  36.2% 
1.5 stories 13.4%  19.1%  20.8% 
2 or more stories or 
split 55.3%  40.5%  43.0%       
Dwelling exterior 
material      
Frame 79.1%  73.7%  72.1% 
Brick 19.7%  24.9%  26.1% 
Siding -  -  - 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame -  -  - 
Asbestos shingle -  -  - 
Stucco -  -  - 
Other 1.3%  1.4%  1.8%       
Quality tier      
Average 32.0%  16.3%  13.1% 
Above average 11.8%  7.4%  9.9% 
Below average 56.1%  76.2%  76.9% 
Sample size 37,088   11,894   2,060 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from the Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018. 
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Table A.4: Parcel Characteristics in Montgomery County, 2008 - 2018 
  All parcels 
  
Parcels between 
0.1 and 0.3 mile 
of an offender   
Parcels within 
0.1 mile of an 
offender 
 Mean  Mean  Mean 
 (SD)  (SD)  (SD) 
Sale price 742.927  531.202  524.912 
(2018 $1,000) (406.17)  (250.28)  (228.56) 
Land size 0.462  0.241  0.214 
(acres) (1.04)  (0.38)  (0.26) 
Structure area 2.413  1.815  1.807 
(1,000 square feet) (1.17)  (0.86)  (0.81) 
age 41.615  50.027  47.282 
(years) (26.18)  (24.30)  (25.82) 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Basement 93.2%  88.4%  87.9%       
Story height      
1 story 24.0%  36.1%  35.0% 
1.5 stories 10.0%  15.1%  13.8% 
2 or more stories or 
split 66.0%  48.8%  51.2%       
Dwelling exterior 
material      
Frame 39.9%  41.4%  39.5% 
Brick 28.7%  33.3%  31.5% 
Siding 21.8%  18.8%  23.2% 
1/2 Brick 1/2 frame 6.8%  4.3%  4.1% 
Asbestos shingle -  -  - 
Stucco -  -  - 
Other 2.8%  2.2%  1.8%       
Quality tier      
Average 41.4%  70.5%  64.5% 
Above average 56.9%  28.2%  33.9% 
Below average 1.4%  1.2%  1.6% 
Sample size 49,227   10,366   1,598 
Notes: Single-family residential sales data was obtained from Maryland Open Data 
Portal, 2008 – 2018. 
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Table A.5: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value in Baltimore City 
  Log (sale price) pre-arrival   Log (sale price), pre- and post-arrival 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.185*** 0.0211  0.00922 0.00980 -0.00514 -0.00579 
 (0.0630) (0.0172)  (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0391) (0.0390) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival    0.0217 0.0219 0.0214 0.0557 
    (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0493) (0.0558) 
Dist<=0.1mile * post-arrival       0.0232 
(0.1 Mile = 1)       (0.0180) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender     -0.0228   
     (0.0248)   
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival     -0.00106 0.00190 -0.0478 
     (0.0171) (0.0359) (0.0532) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival 
= 0    
p-value = 
0.494 
p-value = 
0.492 
p-value = 
0.665 
p-value = 
0.320 
Housing Characteristics  √  √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √       
Census block group-year fixed 
effects 
 √  √ √   
Offender area-year fixed effects      √ √ 
Restricted to Offender Areas and 2 
years pre- and post-arrival 
     √ √ 
Standard errors clustered by... 
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group  
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group 
Offender 
Area 
Offender 
Area 
Sample size 7,104 7,104  7,104 7,104 2,029 2,029 
R-squared 0.051 0.836  0.836 0.836 0.775 0.775 
Notes: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which offenders moved into their current 
address. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value in Baltimore County 
  Log (sale price) pre-arrival   Log (sale price), pre- and post-arrival 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.331*** -0.0111  -0.00737 -0.00132 -0.0122 -0.0124 
 (0.0297) (0.00961)  (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0225) (0.0225) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival    -0.00825 -0.0141 -0.0188 -0.00424 
    (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0306) (0.0351) 
Dist<=0.1mile * post-arrival       0.0102 
(0.1 Mile = 1)       (0.0103) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender     -0.0177*   
     (0.00906)   
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival     0.0132 0.0510* 0.0292 
     (0.0121) (0.0266) (0.0373) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival 
= 0    
p-value = 
0.578 
p-value = 
0.331 
p-value = 
0.538 
p-value = 
0.904 
Housing Characteristics  √  √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √       
Census block group-year fixed 
effects 
 √  √ √   
Offender area-year fixed effects      √ √ 
Restricted to Offender Areas and 
2 years pre- and post-arrival 
     √ √ 
Standard errors clustered by... 
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group  
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group 
Offender 
Area 
Offender 
Area 
Sample size 35,507 35,507  35,507 35,507 5,193 5,193 
R-squared 0.031 0.793  0.793 0.793 0.726 0.726 
Notes: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which offenders moved into their current 
address. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.7: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value in Prince George County 
  Log (sale price) pre-arrival   Log (sale price), pre- and post-arrival 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.137*** 0.0228*  0.0243 0.0346** -0.0202 -0.0201 
 (0.0327) (0.0117)  (0.0182) (0.0173) (0.0285) (0.0285) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival    -0.00328 -0.0144 0.0251 0.0193 
    (0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0317) (0.0359) 
Dist<=0.1mile * post-arrival       -0.00415 
(0.1 Mile = 1)       (0.0124) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender     -0.0274   
     (0.0184)   
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival     0.0239 0.0307 0.0395 
     (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0343) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival 
= 0    
p-value = 
0.866 
p-value = 
0.449 
p-value = 
0.429 
p-value = 
0.590 
Housing Characteristics  √  √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √       
Census block group-year fixed 
effects 
 √  √ √   
Offender area-year fixed effects      √ √ 
Restricted to Offender Areas and 2 
years pre- and post-arrival 
     √ √ 
Standard errors clustered by... 
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group  
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group 
Offender 
Area 
Offender 
Area 
Sample size 37,085 37,085  37,085 37,085 5,685 5,685 
R-squared 0.054 0.578  0.578 0.578 0.646 0.646 
Notes: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which offenders moved into their current 
address. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8: Impact of Sex Offenders' Arrival on Property Value in Montgomery County 
  Log (sale price) pre-arrival   Log (sale price), pre- and post-arrival 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within 0.1 mile of offender -0.315*** -0.0153  -0.0161 -0.00922 -0.0128 -0.0129 
 (0.0381) (0.00945)  (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Within 0.1 mile * post-arrival    0.00182 -0.000558 0.0156 0.0267 
    (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0157) (0.0205) 
Dist<=0.1mile * post-arrival       0.00780 
(0.1 Mile = 1)       (0.00792) 
Within 0.3 mile of offender     -0.0195***   
     (0.00548)   
Within 0.3 mile * post-arrival     0.00397 0.0149 -0.00157 
     (0.00599) (0.0173) (0.0232) 
H0: within 0.1 mile * post-arrival 
= 0    
p-value = 
0.893 
p-value = 
0.967 
p-value = 
0.322 
p-value = 
0.194 
Housing Characteristics  √  √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √       
Census block group-year fixed 
effects 
 √  √ √   
Offender area-year fixed effects      √ √ 
Restricted to Offender Areas and 
2 years pre- and post-arrival 
     √ √ 
Standard errors clustered by... 
Census Block 
Group 
Census Block 
Group  
Census 
Block Group 
Census Block 
Group 
Offender 
Area 
Offender 
Area 
Sample size 49,227 49,227  49,227 49,227 4,469 4,469 
R-squared 0.022 0.882  0.882 0.883 0.848 0.848 
Notes: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which offenders moved into their current 
address. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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